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 Jane Iwamura, in a 2007 article entitled “Critical Faith: Japanese Americans and 
the Birth of a New Civil Religion,” posits that efforts to memorialize the World War II 
incarceration of Japanese Americans constitute a distinct civil religion in America.1 
Iwamura argues that “What has emerged from the collective experience of war and 
internment is a faith that is tied to no particular religious tradition, but that takes racial-
ethnic identity as its starting point. Japanese Americans have developed no less than their 
own brand of civil religion.”2 In defining a theoretical framework for civil religion 
Iwamura draws mainly from the work of Robert Bellah, who first forwarded a theory of 
civil religion in America in 1967. In this piece, “Civil Religion in America,” Bellah aims 
to call attention to a non-sectarian “religious dimension [of] the whole fabric of American 
life” informed by “certain common elements of religious orientation that the great 
majority of Americans share.”3 The way in which this public religious dimension is 
                                                
1 Jane Naomi Iwamura, “Critical Faith: Japanese Americans and the Birth of a New Civil Religion,” 
American Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2007), 939. In the hours following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested about 1,000 Issei (first generation) men in positions of power, and 
this number grew to about 5,500 in the following weeks. Community leaders, Buddhist priests, 
businessmen, and Japanese language instructors were taken from their homes, detained at Immigration and 
Naturalization Services detention centers, and then held at Department of Justice internment camps to await 
hearings. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which 
authorized the Secretary of War and designated military commanders to define military zones from which 
“any or all” persons—regardless of citizenship status—could be excluded. This cleared the way for General 
John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, to act on his firm belief that the Japanese in 
America posed a significant threat following the December 1941 Pearl Harbor attack and issue a series of 
Public Proclamations and Civil Exclusion Orders that forcibly and systematically removed all persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United States. In 1940, according to U.S. Army estimates, 
112,353 persons of Japanese descent were living in California, Washington, and Oregon. The population in 
these three states represented 89% of the national population of Japanese Americans. This population, and 
all persons of Japanese descent living in the western half of Arizona, were incarcerated in various stages. 
Notably, although the government declared the incarceration a “military necessity,” no Japanese Americans 
in Hawaii—theoretically the site of highest military sensitivity considering the Pearl Harbor attack and the 
state’s relative proximity to Japan—were incarcerated. Upon release, many incarcerees traveled to Chicago, 
to the South, and to and other inland areas to resettle. Many also returned to their prior homes with the $25 
and one-way transportation granted them by the WRA, often to find their homes and businesses vandalized 
or foreclosed with belongings stolen. 
2 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 939.  
3 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Dædalus 134, no. 4 (Fall 2015), 42. 
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expressed—ritually, symbolically, and rhetorically—is what Bellah calls American civil 
religion.  
 Operating with a Durkheimian theory of religion and ritual, Bellah claims that 
participation in the ritual activity of the American civil religion—on holidays such as 
Memorial Day and Thanksgiving—not only integrates the family or community into the 
national cult but also renews their dedication to the American vision as it is articulated in 
the Declaration of Independence and invoked by various presidents at crucial junctures in 
American history.4 This vision, one of liberty, equality, and a flourishing of rights for all 
people, provides a transcendent goal both for the political process and for the American 
individual. Acting in accordance with this vision and thus towards this goal is often 
rhetorically framed in terms of the American citizen and the political system striving to 
do God’s work on earth.5 Bellah contends that “God,” here, and the act of invoking God 
in political speeches and oaths indicates that in America, “ultimate sovereignty has been 
attributed to God.”6 Bellah argues against the notion that this invocation of “God”—a 
word that almost all Americans can accept but that means so many different things to so 
many different people—is an “empty sign.”7 On the contrary, Bellah finds that “the 
separation of church and state has not denied the political realm a religious dimension,” 
and that the “common elements of religious orientation” shared by most Americans “have 
played a crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide a 
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political 
sphere.”8  
                                                
4 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 49. 
5 Ibid., 43. 
6 Ibid.,” 42.  
7 Ibid., 41-42.  
8 Ibid., 42.  
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The conviction that God is the implicit and ultimate sovereign of America—
alongside popular sovereignty—supplies a transcendent basis for judging and critiquing 
American policies and actions both at home and abroad.9 Nonetheless, a key part of this 
civil religion is faith in God’s special providence for America. Bellah writes that in a civil 
religious understanding, “[God] is actively interested and involved in history, with a 
special concern for America…Europe is Egypt; America, the promised land. God has led 
his people to establish a new sort of social order that shall be a light unto all nations.”10 
 For Iwamura, it is the critical role of the Japanese American memorialization of 
the incarceration that is paramount and that calls into question Bellah’s claim that 
American civil religion unifies American citizens and reveals the nation’s divine favor. 
Iwamura identifies the Japanese American civil religion as a “critical faith,” one which 
“does not abandon civil religious principles (liberty, equality before the law, due process, 
and so on), but finds it necessary to reinterpret these ideals in relation to the Japanese 
American experience and to make known that experience.”11 This critical process is 
necessary, Iwamura contends, if Americans are to live up to these principles rather than 
conceal their past violation. In other words, the critical role of a Japanese American civil 
religion is necessary if Americans are not to be lulled by the myths that American civil 
religion works to perpetuate. She writes, to “adopt the larger American civil religious 
discourse part and parcel…would be to retain a naive understanding and credulous 
embrace of the same institutions that were used to justify their internment.”12  
Iwamura’s use of the term civil religion is provocative in that she attributes the 
driving force for the creation of this civil religion to the marginalization and exclusion of 
                                                
9 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 43. 
10 Ibid., 45-46.  
11 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 942.  
12 Ibid., 942.  
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citizens of a specific racial-ethnic identity.13 Bellah emphasizes the integrating power of 
civil religion—the power to unite citizens in spite of their differing religious 
affiliations—and ultimately looks towards even greater unity in the form of a potential 
future “civil religion of the world.”14 Iwamura contends that the Japanese American civil 
religion does not reflect or contribute to national solidarity, but rather that “the United 
States is home to many civil religions”15 (emphasis in original), as marginalized 
communities often excluded from, or in this case, targeted by, American institutions are 
“compelled to develop their own civil religious faith…”16 Iwamura sees these civil 
religions as “related to but distinct” from “national expressions” of American civil 
religion.17 However, she does not elaborate on the ways in which this Japanese American 
civil religion is both related to and distinct from an American civil religion.  
Although she does not specifically reference this point in her work, Iwamura’s 
formulation is anticipated by both Robert Bellah and Michael Walzer. Bellah makes 
passing mention of the possibility that there are many civil religions in America, but 
neither affirms nor elaborates on this claim.18 Walzer, in his work On Toleration, presents 
civil religion as an important tool in fostering common identity “in immigrant societies 
where identities are otherwise so diverse,” such as America.19 Given this necessity for 
civil religion to foster national solidarity, Walzer cautions that “…[A] national minority 
with a civil religion of its own can still be tolerated, so long as the rites are celebrated 
                                                
13 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 960.  
14 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 54. 
15 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 960.  
16 Ibid., 960. 
17 Ibid., 960. 
18 Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: The 
Seabury Press, 1975), 107. 
19 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 78.  
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privately.”20 Japanese American civil religion with its public and critical rhetoric and 
rituals calls Walzer’s claim into question. Thus, we arrive at the question inherent in 
Iwamura’s assertion of a critical Japanese American civil religion: what precisely is the 
relationship between American civil religion and Japanese American civil religion? Is it 
the case that American civil religion has tolerated the critical faith of a Japanese 
American civil religion, or has it subdued and absorbed it?   
 I agree with Jane Iwamura as to the distinctiveness of Japanese American civil 
religion and I take up the challenge of elaborating its contours as well as its points of 
contention and congruence with American civil religion.21 This elaboration consists of 
the following elements:  The first is the process (often contentious) by which land and 
space are sacralized in America, and the particular roles of various institutions in this 
process, most notably the National Park Service. The second is the ritualization that 
marks the civil religious calendar, specifically the social death and rebirth of the Japanese 
American community that is afforded by the Days of Remembrance held annually on the 
February 19th anniversary of the issuing of Executive Order 9066, the executive order 
that paved the way for the incarceration.22 The third is my examination of three iterations 
of the Day of Remembrance over a forty-year period—the first event held in Seattle in 
1978, the first national event held in Washington, D.C. in 1998, and a Seattle-area Day of 
Remembrance held in 2018. I examine multiple iterations of this ritual for two reasons: 1) 
to illuminate the dynamic relation between Japanese American civil religion and 
                                                
20 Walzer, On Toleration, 78.  
21 Note one scholar describes the Japanese American post-War pilgrimages as “almost sacral” or “almost 
religious;” see Inouye, The Long Afterlife of Nikkei Wartime Incarceration, 121,127. 
22 The dedication ceremonies and openings of various memorials at the network of assembly centers and 
permanent camps most frequently occur in mid-February, as near to this date as convenient. 
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American civil religion and 2) to highlight the undeniably historical and political 
character of “civil religion.” 
My analysis draws on field visits as well as both primary and secondary sources. I 
received a Grua/O’Connell Research Award which allowed me to travel to Seattle to 
attend the 2018 Day of Remembrance and visit relevant memorials and Japanese 
American community institutions in the area. When home in California over breaks, I 
was also able to visit many former sites of incarceration and study and photograph the 
memorials marking these sites. I have drawn various materials from Denshō—a Seattle-
based nonprofit devoted to preserving and sharing the stories of the incarceration.  These 
materials include the Denshō Digital Archive, an extensive online collection of oral 
histories, photographs, and documents regarding the experience and history of the 
incarceration, as well as their online encyclopedia which provides information on all 
aspects of the incarceration. I also obtained material from the Seattle Public Library’s 
newspaper archives. 
The Religion of American Civil Religions 
Bellah structures his account of American civil religion around conventional 
categories of religion: symbol, ritual, holiday, sacred space, sacrifice and the divine. 
However, the weight he assigns to each is strikingly uneven—Bellah stresses Presidential 
speeches and the sacrificial blood of soldiers. Moreover, Bellah does not go into detail as 
to how the contents of these categories are produced or changed over time. Bellah 
additionally points to no institutions that manage or mediate these various aspects of 
American civil religion. Because the National Park Service as an institution is so central 
to the Japanese American civil religion and because the rhetoric of Japanese American 
civil religion contains no references to God, only to seemingly transcendent ideals, I find 
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Bruce Lincoln’s definition of religion to be helpful in thinking about the religiosity of the 
Japanese American civil religion. The four parts of Lincoln’s definition of religion are as 
follows:  
(1) A discourse whose concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent, 
and that claims for itself a similarly transcendent status. (2) A set of practices 
whose goal is to produce a proper world and/or proper human subjects, as defined 
by a religious discourse to which these practices are connected. (3) A community 
whose members construct their identity with reference to a religious discourse and 
its attendant practices. (4) An institution that regulates religious discourse, 
practices, and community, reproducing them over time and modifying them as 
necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and transcendent value.23 
(emphasis mine) 
 
Lincoln writes that “All four domains—discourse, practice, community, and institution—
are necessary parts of anything that can properly be called a ‘religion.’”24 At the same 
time, he acknowledges that “Each [domain] can be developed and emphasized to 
differing degrees and can relate to the others in various ways.”25 For example, “Discourse 
and practice may be closely coordinated, for instance, or badly out of sync…[I]nstitution 
and community may cooperate closely…or may be locked in power struggles and hold 
each other in contempt.”26  What is especially helpful about Lincoln’s interpretation of 
religion is his recognition that religion is not, despite its pretenses, antithetical to history, 
difference and conflict.  In this paper, I illuminate the ways in which these domains 
function in a Japanese American civil religion, paying attention to the effects of changing 
historical and political contexts. 
Days of Remembrance:  Social Death and Rebirth 
                                                
23 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003), 5-7.  
24 Lincoln, Holy Terrors, 7. 
25 Ibid., 7.  
26 Ibid., 7.  
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 I chose to focus on the Days of Remembrance for several reasons.  First, they 
have received little scholarly attention. In assessing the religious nature of the 
remembrance movement, Iwamura and Joanne Doi both focus on pilgrimage to former 
sites of incarceration.27  Second, insofar as the Days of Remembrance mark the 
anniversary of the government order that precipitated the events of the incarceration, 
these rites direct attention to the government’s unlawful actions and thus retain the 
distinct and critical character of Japanese American civil religion. Third, the Days of 
Remembrance provide a window into the shifting relations between Japanese American 
civil religion and American civil religion. Fourth, the rituals and rhetoric of the various 
Days of Remembrance focus on death and rebirth. I agree with Iwamura’s contention that 
the government’s racialized criminalization and seizure of Japanese American citizens, 
long-term residents, and their properties qualified as a “social death” for the population. I 
not only augment this claim, but also I argue that the first Day of Remembrance in 1978 
constituted a ritual rebirth of the community.   
 For Iwamura, Japanese American civil religion memorializes “the social death of 
Japanese Americans —their racial exclusion in the United States—and ritually 
reaffirm[s] this historical moment and social fact.”28 In contrast to the way in which 
Bellah’s civil religious framework accounts for death—in Christian terms of sacrificial 
death and rebirth, the Japanese American civil religion takes a collective social death as 
its object of memorialization. Iwamura writes that participation in rituals like pilgrimage 
                                                
27 Iwamura’s sacred texts consist of the oral histories of former internees, particularly those presented at the 
1981 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) hearings. The hearings 
held from June to December of 1981 led the CWRIC—a bipartisan federal commission established to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066 and its impact on civilians —to conclude 
that the Japanese American incarceration was a product of "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of 
political leadership,” eventually leading to the passage of the Civil Liberties Act in 1988, which granted 
reparations to Japanese Americans who had been interned. 
28 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 957.  
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and Days of Remembrance “is an obligation that redeploys memory in the service of the 
living (including future generations) and can be distinguished from similar American 
civil religious rituals of memorialization, such as the Gettysburg Address.”29 Iwamura 
here is referencing Bellah’s assertion that the themes of sacrificial death and rebirth 
entered the civil religion with the Civil War.30 Bellah writes that, “With the Christian 
archetype in the background, Lincoln, ‘our martyred president,’ was linked to the war 
dead, those who ‘gave the last full measure of devotion.’ The theme of sacrifice was 
indelibly written into the civil religion.”31 From this development emerged “the most 
hallowed monument of the civil religion,” Arlington National Cemetery, and the ritual 
observance of Memorial Day, a central aspect of Bellah’s ritual calendar.32 In her 
theorization of a Japanese American civil religion, Iwamura adopts a very different 
understanding of death. Namely, death and the dead in the Japanese American civil 
religion are neither viewed in Christian sacrificial terms nor are they viewed in individual 
terms. Iwamura writes that, “The dead—which here includes a sense of what used to be 
(Japanese American life before internment) and what they had hoped to become (fully 
accepted American subjects)—are ever present, but only remain so through continual acts 
of attention and care.”33 Nonetheless, memorialization of death remains a key element of 
both versions of civil religion.  
 Iwamura’s assertion that the closure of businesses and organizations, seizure of 
properties, and incarceration suffered by Japanese Americans constitutes a “social death” 
is well-supported both theoretically and in terms of the rhetoric used to discuss the 
                                                
29 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 957.  
30 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 47-48.  
31 Ibid., 48.  
32 Ibid., 48.  
33 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 957.  
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aftermath of the incarceration. Scholarship on social death spans disciplines and the term 
is used in a multitude of contexts to describe many different phenomena. In a 2015 article 
in Contemporary Social Science, Jana Králová called attention to the ambiguous 
application of the term, and asserted that social death had three central components: “a 
loss of social identity, a loss of social connectedness and losses associated with 
disintegration of the body.”34 Králová contends that true social death is one in which all 
three of these key facets are “severely compromised,” but I would contend, as do Claudia 
Card and Lisa Marie Cacho, that although bodily disintegration or physical violence upon 
the body may certainly be an element of and contribute to social death, it is not a 
necessary component. Rather, I understand social death as a product of compromised 
social or interpersonal bonds and claim that persons can be socially dead yet physically 
unharmed. I take as foundational to my understanding of social death Card’s study of 
social death and genocide and Cacho’s study of social death and racialized rightlessness.  
 Card argues that it is social death that “distinguishes genocide from other mass 
murders. Loss of social vitality [that is, ‘relationships, contemporary and 
intergenerational, that create an identity that gives meaning to life’] is loss of identity and 
thereby of meaning for one’s existence.”35 In the context of genocide, Card finds 
attention to social death valuable in that it points to a more abstract loss of genocide by 
“tak[ing] our focus off body counts and loss of individual talents, directing us instead to 
mourn losses of relationships that create community and give meaning to the 
development of talents.”36 Card notes that controversies over the meaning of “genocide” 
have led to an unstable and variable definition for the term itself but ultimately argues 
                                                
34 Jana Králová, “What is social death?” Contemporary Social Science 10, no. 3 (October 2015), 235.  
35 Claudia Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” Hypatia 18, no. 1 (Winter 2003), 63.  
36 Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” 63.  
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that “What distinguishes genocide is not that it has a different kind of victim, namely, 
groups…Rather, the kind of harm suffered by individual victims of genocide, in virtue of 
their group membership, is not captured by other crimes.”37 That is to say, individuals 
suffer a specific loss when it is their group identity which is the target of violence. This 
loss manifests in a multitude of ways—loss of intergenerational connections, cultural 
heritage, and any socially-informed meaning in one’s life. Card’s understanding of social 
death highlights the less tangible and less individual aspects of community and identity 
that are lost when violence is targeted at a group as a result of their group identity. 
 Lisa Marie Cacho’s 2012 work on social death and “racialized rightlessness and 
the criminalization of the unprotected” also lends credence to the claim that the Japanese 
American incarceration was tantamount to social death.38 Cacho examines “how human 
value is made intelligible through racialized, sexualized, spatialized, and state-sanctioned 
violences.”39 Cacho argues that in a society in which “social value is assigned and denied 
on racial terms,”40 persons of color are disproportionately and permanently criminalized, 
leading her to describe them as “ineligible for personhood—as populations subjected to 
laws but refused the legal means to contest those laws as well as denied both the political 
legitimacy and the moral credibility necessary to question them.”41 Those ineligible for 
personhood, Cacho argues, are socially dead. In the case of the incarceration, the 
racialized rightlessness of Japanese Americans was codified to an extent that it had not 
been previously—even as land and citizenship rights were denied to first generation 
                                                
37 Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” 68.  
38 Lisa Marie Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected 
(New York: New York University Press, 2012).  
39 Cacho, Social Death, 4.  
40 Ibid., 4 
41 Ibid., 6.  
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Japanese immigrants in the prewar years.42 The incarceration stripped the second 
generation, legally American citizens, of their constitutional and civil rights on the basis 
of ethnicity. As such, Cacho’s argument makes an explicit link between racially-
motivated, state-sanctioned violence and the social death of Japanese Americans in 
WWII.   
 Finally, it is worth noting that much of the language used by members of the 
Japanese American community during remembrance activity as well as scholars of the 
incarceration is suggestive of social death. The first iterations of remembrance events—
pilgrimages and Days of Remembrance—that took place in the late 1960s and 70s were 
groundbreaking for a community that had been relatively silent regarding the 
incarceration since the war. Countless Sansei (third generation) tell stories of not 
realizing until their teenage years that when their parents talked about “camp” with other 
Japanese Americans it was not in reference to summer camps like the ones they 
themselves attended. The incarceration produced a variety of responses from shame to 
bitterness that led many to refrain from sharing their experience with their children.43 As 
such, speakers like Jim Matsuoka, one of the leaders of the first Manzanar pilgrimage, 
stated: “When people ask me, ‘How many people are buried in this cemetery?’ I say a 
whole generation is buried here. The Nisei Americans lie buried in the sands of 
Manzanar.”44 Anthropologist Yasuko Takezawa writes of the first Day of Remembrance 
                                                
42 Targeted anti-Japanese immigration restrictions began in 1908 with the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” 
between the U.S. and Japan. This arrangement restricted the immigration of Japanese laborers to the U.S., 
still allowing Japanese women married to U.S. residents to immigrate. Animosity towards Japanese 
laborers—most in the agricultural sector—was likewise reflected in the Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 
that prevented Japanese immigrants from owning land in California. Finally, in 1924 the Johnson-Reed Act 
ended all Japanese immigration to the United States. 
43 Don T. Nakanishi, “Surviving Democracy’s Mistake: Japanese Americans and the Enduring Legacy of 
Executive Order 9066,” Amerasia Journal 19, no. 1 (1993), 15.  
44 The Manzanar Pilgrimage: A Time for Sharing (Los Angeles: Manzanar Committee, 1981), 12. 
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in Puyallup in 1978 as the event that “burst open the tomb of Japanese American 
history.”45 Karen Inouye cites participants in the first Manzanar pilgrimage discussing 
what felt like an “exhuming” of history.46 These comments all speak to some 
acknowledgement of a broad, non-personified or individualized death as well as the sense 
of revivifying the community that came with remembrance activity. The ways in which 
the sacralizations and rituals of a Japanese American civil religion seek to restore social 
vitality, and the extent to which they are successful, will be discussed throughout this 
project.  
The Politics of American Civil Religions 
The relationship between American and Japanese American civil religion defies 
summation as it shifts depending on the historical and political context. At times, 
Japanese American civil religion testifies to the particularity and criminality of the events 
of the incarceration; at other points, it addresses all Americans through the ecumenical 
speech and rituals of American civil religion. Japanese American civil religion is a 
critical faith and dissonant practice that demythologizes the myth of American 
exceptionalism yet has also supplied spaces and occasions for pledging allegiance to it. 
This dynamic likely reflects, in part, the ambivalence of Japanese Americans—their 
desire to mark their cultural and historical distinction as well as a desire to feel included 
in the evocation of one nation of many peoples. 
More importantly, the dynamic character of this relationship points to the 
impossibility of separating religion and politics in America and to Bellah’s inadvertent 
depoliticization of American civil religion. What Bellah was doing by talking about 
                                                
45 Yasuko Takezawa, Breaking the Silence: Redress and Japanese American Ethnicity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press), 196.  
46 Karen Inouye, The Long Afterlife of Nikkei Wartime Incarceration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2016), 129.  
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American civil religion was bringing religion and politics together, positing a 
transcendent religion “of the American state.” Yet while Bellah acknowledges that “[i]n 
no society can religion and politics ignore each other,”47 Bellah’s fundamental argument 
is that there is an encompassing national religion beyond sectarian divisions. He claims 
that the civil religious dimension “provides a transcendent goal for the political process” 
but surely it is also bound up with that process.48 Bellah’s emphasis on unity and on a 
“sacred canopy” that transcends divisions to encompass American society is overplayed 
to the extent that it obscures the difference, dissidence, and contention in American 
politics and society. In this way, Bellah’s theory of American civil religion is ironically 
depoliticized. 
Bellah is not alone in emphasizing (and sometimes sermonizing about) the 
unifying character of American civil religion. In his work American Civil Religion: What 
Americans Hold Sacred, Peter Gardella analyzes what he identifies as the forms of 
American civil religion, devoting one chapter to each. Gardella looks at texts—the 
Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution, to name a 
few—as well as speeches, artifacts like the flag and the great seal, places like Arlington 
and Gettysburg national cemeteries as well as Jamestown and Boston Common, songs 
like the Star Spangled Banner and America the Beautiful, and broader concepts like the 
Four Freedoms and the City on a Hill. Gardella takes as foundational Bellah’s theory of 
civil religion, but expounds upon it slightly, identifying four values that unify the stories 
of each artifact and link these stories to one another. These values, in Gardella’s words, 
are “personal freedom (often called liberty), political democracy, world peace, and 
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cultural (including religious, racial, ethnic and gender) tolerance.”49 These values, 
Gardella writes are today “often advanced by political leaders and advocates who ask 
Americans to kill and to risk their own lives while executing policies of the US 
government.”50 The way in which Gardella identifies these values is interesting, choosing 
concepts “denied by no one who claims to speak in the tradition of the United States” yet 
not expressing a concern either for what people take these values to mean or for what 
values America could be presumed to hold based on its actions.51 For example, Gardella 
claims that “Although the United States is a very violent nation, and violence always 
raises religious issues because it touches the boundary of life and death, violence is not a 
value of American civil religion like liberty, democracy, peace, and tolerance.”52 
Gardella bases this contention in the fact that a few of the articles he identifies as forms 
of civil religion laud peace and preach against violence.53 Gardella, like Bellah, is careful 
to preach the gospel of tolerance rather than exclusion, unity rather than dissent.  
For scholars John Murphy and Robert Wuthnow, these celebratory and critical 
modalities represent different versions or forms of American civil religion. In the 
“priestly version” of American civil religion—Wuthnow’s term—America’s special 
relationship with God is emphasized.54 This maps on to Murphy’s “conservative version” 
of American civil religion, “a much more traditional version of civil religion that resists 
refinement and improvement of America, but focuses more on a renewal of belief in 
                                                
49 Peter Gardella, American Civil Religion: What Americans Hold Sacred (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 3. 
50 Gardella, American Civil Religion, 3.  
51 Ibid., 3.  
52 Ibid., 3.  
53 Ibid., 3.  
54 Jason Edwards and Joseph M. Valenzano III, “Introduction,” in The Rhetoric of American Civil Religion: 
Symbols, Sinners, and Saints ed. Jason Edwards and Joseph Valenzano (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 
xiii.  
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America itself.”55 In contrast, Wuthnow’s liberal or “prophetic version” of American 
civil religion tends to “downplay America’s chosenness and its important place in the 
divine order.”56 In Murphy’s binary, “This form of civil religion is much more expansive. 
It calls for the United States to constantly progress and meet the needs and challenges of 
its citizens as it strives to become a ‘more perfect union.’”57  
I am not convinced that Japanese American civil religion is simply a prophetic 
critical variant insofar as it marks the state’s criminal violence towards its own citizens. 
To do so, I believe, would obscure the persistence and foundational nature of racism and 
exclusion in America. Nor do I regard the self-critical aspect of American civil religion to 
be sufficiently robust or inclusive. Rhys Williams, in a 2013 article entitled “Civil 
Religion and the Cultural Politics of National Identity in Obama’s America” calls 
attention to the assumptions of American civil religion, which he identifies as a “tribal” 
civil religion. Williams writes that, “[American civil religion] is not only a universalist, 
prophetic creed, it is also an expression of tribal identity that ascribes a particular 
character and purpose to the American people. In particular, this ‘tribal’ civil religion has 
an often-unstated assumption about the inseparability of religion, race, and national 
identity—that is, white, Christian, and American.”58 Williams does well to question the 
extent to which the theory of American civil religion—emerging, as he claims, as a 
response to “the potential crisis in social solidarity that was to follow…pluralism”59—has 
a concern for the inclusion of those outside of the “tribe” in the body politic. Williams 
thus advocates for an understanding of civil religion that keeps “multiple strands of 
                                                
55 Edwards & Valenzano, Rhetoric, xiii.  
56 Ibid., xiii-xiv.  
57 Ibid., xiii.  
58 Rhys H. Williams, “Civil Religion and the Cultural Politics of National Identity in Obama’s America,” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52, no. 2 (2013), 239.  
59 Williams, “Cultural Politics,” 242.  
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political exclusion and cultural inclusion contained within the concept.”60 Otherwise, 
Williams argues, civil religion has the potential to be highly divisive: “Civil religious 
discourse can critique society and call us to be better than we are. But civil religious 
discourse also works to heighten boundaries, and convinces people that those boundaries 
are natural and even sacred.”61  
In 1992 Marita Sturken articulated similar concerns, probing the political 
implications of memorializing the incarceration. Sturken asked what the appropriate 
memory of the incarceration would look like, what kind of memorial the incarceration 
demanded, and whether or not any memorial could “properly memorialize the event,”62 
asserting the profound ramifications of remembering the incarceration. Sturken claimed 
that “To begin to memorialize the camps would mean to open up the question of what 
constitutes American nationalism and identity. To properly memorialize the camps and 
their survivors would mean to rethink the myth of America’s actions in World War II, a 
myth that even now remains resolutely intact.”63 This national myth also draws 
commentary from Caroline Chung Simpson in her work on the incarceration, in which 
she argues that as a “war against tyranny and oppression,” World War II “often 
necessitated portraying the United States as a virtual paragon of democratic virtues. But 
when the internment did emerge as a topic of discussion it threatened to undermine the 
reputation of U.S. democracy because the internment exposed the arbitrariness of the 
very enterprise of national history and the myth of exceptionalism that history sustains.”64 
                                                
60 Williams, “Cultural Politics,” 254.  
61 Ibid., 254.  
62 Marita Sturken, “Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment,” 
positions 5, no. 3 by Duke University Press (1997), 703-704.  
63 Sturken, “Absent Images,” 704.  
64 Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American Culture, 
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In problematizing the dual ideas of America as an exceptional paragon of virtue and 
America as an agent of state violence in the incarceration of its own citizens, Simpson 
and Sturken speak to a tension that is raised by Iwamura’s use of Bellah’s civil religious 
framework, but not fully explained. It is this point of tension that I initially found so 
intriguing, and which drove me to develop and pursue this project. It was not until I read 
Sturken’s piece, however, that I was able to understand exactly what made this endeavor 
so important. What is intriguing is not just that the incarceration threatens America’s 
national myth, but it is what is at stake when the national myth is uncritically 
promulgated. Sturken writes: 
This narrative of a moral nation forms the central image of American nationalism 
in the second half of the twentieth century—it is the primary element of what 
Lauren Berlant has termed the ‘national symbolic,’ the process by which 
individuals are transformed into ‘subjects of a collectively-held history.’ Full 
acknowledgment of the memory of the camps would require a refiguring of the 
definition of the national meaning of ‘America’ and an acknowledgment that 
winning the war has for decades profoundly hampered any discourse on the 
question of the national myth…65 
 
Broadly, then, this project aims to call into question the national myth and consider the 
implications of nationalism on history, memory, and identity. I seek to understand, as 
Simpson well-articulates it, “[H]ow history and memory are negotiated when the need to 
remember an event challenges the ideals of democratic nationalism and the narrative 
unity of nation that historical discourses ostensibly provide.”66 
 In the post-9/11 era and in light of regulations such as the 2002-2016 National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which increased the screening of travelers from 
predominantly Muslim countries, and President Trump’s “Muslim ban,” Executive Order 
13769, the dangers of the national myth to heighten boundaries and assert a certain type 
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of Americanness are highly relevant. When the American civil religion’s vision of unity 
fails to account for populations on the margins and when beliefs in America as 
exceptional or as a paragon preclude critiques of the nation, the civil religious discourse 
and expression is in danger of silencing or erasing its non-dominant populations. With 
this project, I hope to—as the Japanese American civil religion seeks to—link past and 
present injustices in the hope that illuminating the dangers of the national myth will 
create space for a sincere reconsideration of what it means to be American. 
A Note on Terminology 
 In 2005 Roger Daniels published an essay entitled “Words Do Matter: A Note on 
Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans.” In this 
work Daniels notes that “…[T]here has been a long history of using euphemistic 
language about the wartime atrocity that was wreaked upon the Japanese Americans of 
the West Coast during and after World War II. Begun with malice aforethought by 
government officials, politicians, and journalists, it has been continued, largely in 
thoughtless innocence, by scholars.”67 Of primary concern is the use of “internment” vs. 
“incarceration” in this context. Daniels notes that “internment” is “an ordinary aspect of 
declared war and refer[s] to a legal process, described in United States statutes, to be 
applied to nationals of a country with which the United States was at war…perhaps eight 
thousand Japanese nationals had been formally interned by the government during World 
War II.”68 Although this wartime internment was “accompanied by a great deal of 
injustice,” Daniels notes that “it was conducted legally, and those interned got a 
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68 Daniels, “Words Do Matter,” 190.  
 20 
semblance of due process,”69 additionally noting that the facilities and living conditions 
of these internment camps were superior to the camps in which West Coast Japanese 
Americans were incarcerated, in part because the United States had greater pressure here 
to meet Geneva Convention conditions.70 In contrast, Daniels argues, “What happened to 
those West Coast Japanese Americans who were incarcerated in army and WRA 
concentration camps was simply lawless.”71  Daniels here uses the term “concentration 
camp,” which brings us to the next genre of euphemistic language commonly used to 
discuss the wartime incarceration—the terms used to describe the sites of incarceration 
such as “relocation center” or “internment camp.” The use of “concentration camp,” 
Daniels illustrates, was strongly resisted by WRA administrators, especially after the 
liberation of Nazi death camps, commonly described as “concentration camps.”72 
However, as Jasmine Alinder notes in her work on the incarceration, “In the context of 
the Holocaust, the term ‘concentration camp’ is itself a euphemism that obscures the 
murderous designs of death camps such as Auschwitz or Buchenwald.”73 “Concentration 
camp,” Alinder argues, applies more accurately to the United States camps. Throughout 
this project, I will use the term “incarceration” to refer to the wartime imprisonment of 
West Coast Japanese Americans, and I will use the phrase “concentration camp” to 
describe the sites of incarceration. When various scholars, novelists, and interviewees use 
the phrase internment I keep the phrasing as quoted, but in my own words refer to the 
event as the Japanese American incarceration for the sake of accuracy.  
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Chapter One: Contesting Sacred Space 
 
 As the seminal theorist of American civil religion, Robert Bellah dominates our 
understanding of civil religion in America. However, Bellah’s formulation of American civil 
religion primarily concerns itself with ideology rather than embodied practice or use of space—
the role of sacred space in the American civil religion certainly is not central to Bellah’s theory.1 
Indeed, existing theories of civil religion in America are not primarily concerned with either 
sacred space or with the contestations over these spaces.2 As regards sacred space in America, 
Bellah places national cemeteries like Arlington and Gettysburg as well as the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier within the American civil religious fold, but he does not go into any discussion 
of the ways in which Americans interact with these spaces.3 Furthermore, Bellah does not detail 
how these spaces are sacralized and maintained in America. He implies that Gettysburg is 
sanctified by Lincoln’s address there as well as by the interred bodies of sacrificed soldiers (as is 
the case at Arlington), but he points to no ongoing sanctification nor to any particular agency or 
institution that would oversee such a process.  
Peter Gardella is one of the few scholars of American civil religion writing after Bellah 
who focuses more closely on sacred space in his discussion of American civil religion. Gardella 
expands the number of American civil religious spaces to include sites such as Ellis Island, the 
Boston Common & Freedom Trail, and Jamestown.4 Notably, the types of stories these sites tell 
make them easy to include in the civil religious fold because they reinforce the principled and 
                                               
1 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 48.  
2 For instance, Philip Gorski, in his American Covenant: A History of Civil Religion From the Puritans to the 
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triumphalist vision of America. As Karen Inouye writes, “Government-sponsored cultural and 
political monuments generally tend to be triumphalist, like the Washington Monument and 
Lincoln Memorial. Publicly funded and overseen by elected or appointed officials, they are 
designed to reinforce an interpretive community by establishing a favorable primary narrative 
people can congregate around.”5 What does this suggest about the memorialization of the former 
concentration camps that housed Japanese Americans during World War II?  
In American Sacred Space, editors David Chidester and Edward Linenthal place 
memorials at former sites of Japanese American incarceration—specifically, the memorial at the 
site of the Manzanar concentration camp in Eastern California—within the purview of American 
civil religion. In their commentary on space and American civil religion, they write:  
American historical experience has fashioned a national, public, or civil religion that has 
depended heavily on the production of sacred space…It encompasses elements of the 
patriotic landscape that celebrate the nation, as well as places that mourn abandoned ideals, 
the National Park Service site of the Manzanar concentration camp for Americans of 
Japanese ancestry during World War II, for example.6 
 
Chidester’s and Linenthal’s binary of sacred spaces of celebration and failure evokes the 
common distinction in scholarship on American civil religion of its priestly and prophetic modes, 
respectively. Thus, to Chidester and Linenthal, those monuments which “mourn abandoned 
ideals”—presumably those expressed in the Constitution and taken as transcendent within the 
American civil religion—represent physical manifestations of the overarching American civil 
religion. In contrast, Marita Sturken reads the relationship between these memorials and 
American civil religion as fundamentally incompatible. Sturken argues that “To begin to 
memorialize the camps would mean to open up the question of what constitutes American 
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nationalism and identity. To properly memorialize the camps and their survivors would mean to 
rethink the myth of America’s actions in World War II, a myth that even now [in 1997] remains 
absolutely intact.”7 For Sturken, memorializing the camps cannot be envisioned as simply one 
regrettable episode in America’s ongoing struggle to live up to its constitutional ideals. The 
incarceration is not an instance of abandoned ideals, but of state violence against its own citizens 
and long-term residents. How, then, are we to understand the memorialization of Japanese 
American concentration camps in relation to American civil religion? 
I agree that the sacralization of particular spaces is a key feature of American civil 
religion—American civil religion is not reducible to national holidays or the rhetoric of 
presidential speeches. I contend that the memorialized former sites of Japanese American 
incarceration constitute the sacred spaces of a Japanese American civil religion. The relationship 
between the sacred maps of the American and Japanese American civil religious landscapes is, 
however, complicated. I reject the claim that the archipelago of Japanese American civil 
religious sacred sites is merely a mournful complement to a “patriotic landscape,” with both 
constituting the sacred map of an American civil religion stretching “from sea to shining sea.”8 
Nonetheless, at various points and on certain occasions, they overlap. I suggest, then, that tracing 
the spaces of this Japanese American civil religion throws into sharp relief that the borders of the 
nation remain subject to dispute. Drawing from Chidester’s and Linenthal’s theory of sacred 
space as situational and contested, and highlighting in particular the role of the National Park 
Service in claiming and signifying America’s sacred spaces, I analyze the shifting contours of 
Japanese American civil religion.   
                                               
7 Sturken, “Absent Images,” 704.  
8 Chidester & Linenthal, American Sacred Space, 30.  
 24 
 David Chidester and Edward Linenthal identify two basic types of definitions of the 
sacred: substantial and situational definitions.9 In the first “substantial” category, “the sacred has 
been identified as an uncanny, awesome, or powerful manifestation of reality, full of ultimate 
significance.”10 The sacred irrupts or manifests without human involvement. Chidester and 
Linenthal take Mircea Eliade’s work to be emblematic of this approach. The “situational” 
understanding of the sacred instead recognizes that “nothing is inherently sacred.”11 The authors 
write that according to this type of definition, “Not full of meaning, the sacred, from this 
perspective, is an empty signifier…a sign of difference that can be assigned to virtually anything 
through the human labor of consecration.”12 This understanding of the sacred as something 
produced through human endeavors, the authors argue, originates with Emile Durkheim.13 In the 
context of this project especially, the sacred as a situational term is useful in that it illuminates 
the activity and effort that goes into sacralizing a space. Considering the sacred as a human 
production is helpful in understanding how the relationship of these sites to the Japanese 
American population changes after the war.  
 Chidester and Linenthal’s insistence on the constructed and situational character of 
sacred space leads them to emphasize that such space is “frequently, if not inherently, 
contested.”14 First, they argue that “sacred space is contested for the simple reason that it is 
spatial.”15 Relying on the theories of human geographers, especially John Urry, Chidester and 
Linenthal argue that, as Urry suggests, “the spatial dynamics of conflict can be explained by the 
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10 Ibid., 5.  
11 Ibid., 5-6. 
12 Ibid., 5-6.  
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fact that no two objects can occupy the same point in space. ‘Hence…space is necessarily limited 
and there has to be competition and conflict over its organization and control.’”16 There is no 
reason, Chidester and Linenthal suggest, that the finiteness of spatial resources should not also 
introduce conflict into sacred spaces. They write that “conflict has been analyzed by geographers 
as a necessary feature of spatiality. Therefore, we should not be surprised that sacred space is 
entangled in competition over scarce spatial resources, including conflicts over the hypothetical 
resource of spatiality itself.”17 Chidester and Linenthal acknowledge that the second reason they 
identify for the contested nature of sacred space is at first glance contradictory to their first point. 
They argue that “When space or place becomes sacred, spatially scarce resources are 
transformed into a surplus of signification. As an arena of signs and symbols, a sacred space 
is…a point of departure for an endless multiplication of meaning…In this respect, a sacred place 
is not defined by spatial limits; it is open to unlimited claims and counter-claims on its 
significance.”18 Infinite possibilities for interpretation necessarily beget competing 
interpretations. Furthermore, Chidester and Linenthal argue that interpretation is, for this same 
reason, never fully fixed. They write, “Due to the inherent surplus of signification in ‘the sacred,’ 
no appropriation can ever be final, no exclusion can be total, and, therefore, conflict over 
ownership and control of the symbolic surplus remains endemic in sacred space.”19   
Given that Chidester and Linenthal insist on the contested character of American sacred 
space, it is surprising that they declare Manzanar a site for mourning the abandoned ideals of 
America that is nonetheless subsumed into the sacred space of American civil religion. It is 
likewise surprising that although citizens and long-term residents were imprisoned at Manzanar 
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without charges or trial, Chidester and Linenthal speak exclusively of mourned ideals rather than 
persons, communities and businesses. What Chidester and Linenthal appear to have lost sight of 
is the violence represented by the camps. 
In his 1997 work Shadowed Ground, Kenneth Foote focuses on the memorialization of 
and attitudes toward sites of violence in America, the role of which in American society he 
contends is “a fiercely contested issue.”20 Foote’s primary argument about the power of these 
sites is that “the evidence of violence left behind often pressures people, almost involuntarily, to 
begin debate over meaning.”21  The violence of the incarceration may not have entailed 
bloodshed, but it was undoubtedly violence committed by the state against citizens.  Thus, it 
seems inevitable that reclaiming and memorializing these spaces would necessarily entail 
contestation as well cooperation with the state. 
 The sites under consideration here represent only a subset of the facilities maintained by 
various agencies of the United States government during World War II to detain, intern, and 
incarcerate various individuals and populations. During the war, the U.S. Army, the Department 
of Justice, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), and the Wartime Civil Control Administration 
(WCCA) operated between them a number of prisons, (legal) internment camps, concentration 
camps (both transitional and long term), and immigrant detention stations. There was some 
facility of one of these types in every Western state save Nevada, internment camps and 
immigrant detention centers as far south as Texas and Florida and as far east as New York and 
Boston, and additional U.S. Army internment camps in Alaska and Hawaii. Of the more long-
term prison facilities—concentration camps, Department of Justice internment camps, and WRA 
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“Citizen Isolation Centers” to which incarcerees deemed “refractory” were often sent 
temporarily before being relocated to the high-security Tule Lake concentration camp—all were 
located in supreme isolation in the interior of the nation.  
 The vast majority of Japanese Americans were incarcerated in WRA-operated 
concentration camps and in “temporary assembly centers”—rapidly converted fairgrounds and 
racetracks in which Japanese Americans were forced to live from roughly March or April 1942 
until as late as October 1942. There were seventeen of these “assembly centers,” more accurately 
described as temporary concentration camps: thirteen in California, two in Arizona, and one each 
in Washington and Oregon.22 When construction on the long-term concentration camps was 
completed, incarcerees were forcibly transferred from the “assembly centers” to one of the ten 
WRA camps, often on buses or trains with blacked out windows so that the route to and precise 
location of the camps remained somewhat uncertain. The ten WRA concentration camps were as 
follows: Tule Lake (CA), Manzanar (CA), Gila River (AZ), Poston (AZ), Granada (CO), Topaz 
(UT), Minidoka (ID), Heart Mountain (WY), Rohwer (AR), and Jerome (AR).23 Although the 
particularities of each site alone could provide fodder for entire studies (and have done so), I will 
not be able to delve into the specifics of each site. Over the course of this project, I focus 
primarily on Manzanar in Eastern California and the Puyallup Assembly Center in Washington 
State, named “Camp Harmony” by military officials. Manzanar and Puyallup were the two sites 
at which the first highly significant and public remembrance activities took place—the first 
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official Manzanar Committee Pilgrimage in 1969 and the first Day of Remembrance at Puyallup 
in 1978.  
 While the nature of remembrance activity at the various sites is highly variable, what is 
clear is that the former sites of incarceration have tremendous significance for the Japanese 
American communities to which their history is linked.  Pilgrimages to the sites of former camps 
began as early as 1946.  Although the Manzanar Committee began organizing official 
pilgrimages in 1969, a Buddhist priest and a Christian minister who had been incarcerated at 
Manzanar had been leading a group to the small collection of graves remaining in the Manzanar 
cemetery every year on Memorial Day following the closure of the concentration camp.  Five of 
the long-term concentration camps—Granada, Minidoka, Manzanar, Tule Lake, and Heart 
Mountain—currently have annual pilgrimages. 24  Several others—the Santa Anita Assembly 
Center (CA), Poston, and the Fort Lincoln Department of Justice internment camp near 
Bismarck, North Dakota—draw less regular pilgrimage activity.25  In their analyses of Japanese 
American civil religion, Jane Iwamura and Joanne Doi devote the bulk of their analysis to 
pilgrimages to former sites of incarceration, as “such a pilgrimage for Japanese Americans 
represents a ‘sacred journey’ that relives and recollects a ‘sacred story of suffering and spirit.’”26 
                                               
24 These pilgrimages take place over the same weekends each year—Tule Lake on the last weekend of June, 
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25 “Camp Pilgrimages,” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
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Assembly Center in California has also been the site of annual Day of Remembrance activity since the 1980s. 
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26 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 938, quoting Joanne Doi. It must be noted that Iwamura’s discussion of pilgrimage 
focuses on the Manzanar pilgrimage exclusively, while Joanne Doi focuses on the pilgrimages to Manzanar and 
Tule Lake—neither piece discusses the entire range of pilgrimages to the various former sites of incarceration. 
Furthermore, I want to acknowledge the ways in which Iwamura’s language here is evocative of the concept of 
collective memory. Throughout the course of this analysis I will discuss the collective experience of the 1978 Day of 
Remembrance and the collective identity it worked to construct, but I hesitate to invoke “collective memory.” In 
reading the few novels published by Japanese Americans in the immediate postwar years, a major motif that 
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These pilgrimages center on the remembrance of those who died while incarcerated, the 
recognition of the injustice of the incarceration and the profound isolation of the camps, and the 
renewal of the commitment to ensure that such an injustice will never happen again.27 The 
pilgrimage event, Iwamura argues, “is at once festival, political forum, and religious 
ceremony.”28 Even in the years following the achievement of redress and reparations—initially 
the most prominent political goals of the pilgrimage—Iwamura argues that “the pilgrimages 
continue to fulfill an important function. Nisei join their children and grandchildren on these 
journeys, and the rituals have become intergenerational affairs. As such, they provide the 
opportunity to share long-suppressed stories and feelings with one another.”29 Pilgrimage activity 
derives its power from the ability of Japanese American pilgrims to “inhabit the shadowed 
ground of internment.”30 In doing so, Japanese Americans reclaim and sacralize (on an on-going 
basis) the sites of former concentration camps.  
 Many former sites of incarceration also bear memorials to their wartime use, and these 
sites all witnessed commemorative or remembrance activity when these memorials were finished 
and dedicated.31  All ten former long-term WRA concentration camps and many of the 
temporary camps have memorials on site.  The Merced Assembly Center in California had 
ceremonies for both the placement of a California State Historic designation plaque in 1982 and 
                                               
emerges—especially in John Okada’s 1957 No-No Boy—is the difficulty of communicating in the postwar due to the 
vast variety in wartime experience. The postwar “silence” suggests that collective identity had to be reconstituted, 
and that a collective memory did not immediately emerge from the collective experience of the incarceration, nor 
was any memory of the incarceration maintained through communication during this pre-1978 Day of 
Remembrance period of relative silence.  
27 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 938.  
28 Ibid., 938.  
29 Ibid., 951.  
30 Joanne Doi, “Bridge to Compassion: Theological Pilgrimage to Tule Lake and Manzanar,” PhD diss., University 
of California Berkeley (2007), 66, 106, 251.  
31 These dedication ceremonies often take place on February 19th, the anniversary of the signing of Executive Order 
9066. The relevance of this date to the Japanese American civil religion will be discussed in the next chapters. 
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for the significant expansion of this memorial in 2010.32 At the Puyallup Assembly Center in 
Washington, now the Washington State Fairgrounds, a memorial sculpture created by Japanese 
American artist George Tsutakawa was dedicated in 1983, then rededicated in 2017 to honor the 
75th anniversary of the Seattle Japanese American community’s incarceration at the 
fairgrounds.33 
Between November 2017 and January 2018 I was able to visit eight of the memorials in 
California’s Central Valley as well as the memorial at the Washington State Fairgrounds in 
Puyallup, Washington—formerly “Camp Harmony.” 34 All of the California sites were former 
“assembly centers” in Central and Northern California, and four of these eight were on the sites 
of still-functioning fairgrounds. The eight former assembly center sites I was able to visit were 
those at Sacramento, Stockton, Turlock, Merced, Pinedale, Fresno, Salinas, and Tanforan. All of 
these sites were easily accessible to the public. For the four in fairgrounds—Stockton, Merced, 
Turlock, and Fresno—the fairground gates were open although there was no formal activity 
taking place at the site, and parking was easily available. Of those sites that are no longer 
fairgrounds, the site of the former Sacramento Assembly Center was since razed to construct a 
housing development, and the site is also bisected by Interstate 80. There is a memorial for the 
Sacramento site in Walerga Park, a small public park adjacent to I-80 on the site of the former 
assembly center (see Figures 1&2, Appendix). The Pinedale Assembly Center has likewise been 
developed over, but a remembrance plaza featuring storyboards and a fountain created by Gerard 
Tsutakawa, George Tsutakawa’s son, stands in the center of the plaza (Figures 8&9, Appendix). 
                                               
32 “Merced (detention facility),” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Merced_(detention_facility)/ For images of the Merced Assembly Center memorial, 
see Figures 4-7 in the Appendix. 
33 Tamiko Nimura, “For the Sake of the Ancestors and the Children: The ‘Small But Mighty’ Work of the Camp 
Harmony Committee,” Discover Nikkei (7 April, 2016). http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/article/6203/ 
34 For images of the memorials at these sites, see the included Appendix beginning on page 99.  
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Sherwood Hall, a community center and performance venue, now stands on the site of the former 
Salinas Assembly Center, and there is a state historical marker and remembrance garden in a 
publicly accessible green space behind the Sherwood Hall building.  
The site at Puyallup was host to the first Day of Remembrance in 1978. In 1983, a 
memorial sculpture created by Seattle-area Japanese American artist George Tsutakawa was 
dedicated at the site with the help of Washington State Governor John Spellman and other state 
representatives wanting to express their support for the redress movement.35 The fairgrounds that 
were once converted into “Camp Harmony” are now privately owned by the Washington State 
Fair. I visited this site in February of 2018, about six months after the memorial had been 
rededicated and expanded in early September of 2017.   
 The relative inaccessibility of the Puyallup memorial distinguished this site from the four 
sites in California that I visited that also remain on fairgrounds. On the day I visited Puyallup, 
the fairgrounds were being prepared for an upcoming trade of auto parts. The site was closed to 
the public, and security guards stood at the one open gate to restrict entrance only to those 
involved in the upcoming event. In contrast, the four sites at former fairgrounds that I visited in 
California—at Stockton, Merced, Fresno, and Turlock—were open to the public, the memorials 
theoretically accessible to any individual who desired to visit them. I was only able to access the 
memorial sculpture at Puyallup after assuring the security staff that I would only be in the 
fairgrounds for a few minutes to take photos of the memorial, after which the guards at the 
entrance cleared the prospect of me entering with their head of security. Their head of security 
escorted me to the memorial. It is worth noting that neither of the two security guards at the 
entrance—both of whom had worked at the fairgrounds site for multiple years—knew what 
                                               
35 “Puyallup (detention facility),” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Puyallup_(detention_facility)/#Remembering_Camp_Harmony 
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memorial I was referring to even after I showed them a photograph of the sculpture, nor had they 
heard that the fairgrounds had been used to incarcerate Japanese Americans during the war. The 
head of security who walked me to the memorial expressed that none of the fairgrounds staff 
knew what the memorial sculpture was supposed to depict, and expressed that the site largely 
served as a space for fairgrounds workers to take smoking breaks. He did recall that in 
September of 2017 several buses of Japanese Americans visited the site, presumably for the 
rededication of the Tsutakawa memorial which took place at that time.  
In a 1983 interview for the Archives of American Art’s Northwest Oral History Project, 
George Tsutakawa describes the process of designing and installing his memorial sculpture at the 
State Fairgrounds. Tsutakawa was approached by a committee formed by the Seattle and 
Puyallup chapters of the JACL who wanted a memorial built and dedicated at Puyallup. 
Tsutakawa describes a two to three-year process of meeting with this JACL committee over 
questions of what the memorial should look like and how large it could be based on how much 
money they would be able to raise. After Tsutakawa drew up designs and discussed them with 
the committee, he was scheduled to meet before the Fair Association’s board meeting at the 
fairgrounds’ office.36 As Tsutakawa recalls, “The members of the fair board and some of the 
leading citizens of City of Puyallup…and myself and my wife, and one of the representatives 
from the Puyallup chapter of JACL came and we had a meeting. But it was very surprising to me 
that during this meeting the—what do you call—the feeling and the climate of the meeting was 
all anti-Japanese, anti-monument.”37 Tsutakawa goes on to explain that this was largely because 
the Washington State Fair was a private entity. He recalled that “their argument was that using 
                                               
36 “Oral History Interview with George Tsutakawa,” Conducted by Martha Kingsbury in Seattle, Washington, 
Archives of American Art (Smithsonian), September 8, 12, 14 &19, 1983. 
https://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/interviews/oral-history-interview-george-tsutakawa-11913#transcript 
37 “Oral History Interview with George Tsutakawa,” Archives of American Art. 
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the fairground as assembly point for the Japanese internees in 1942 under the Western command 
of General [Dewitt] was not their intention. You see, the U.S. Government or the army, Western 
command, just took that place and used it as assembly point.”38 When asked by the interviewer if 
the fair management thought that “putting a monument [on the fairgrounds] would make them 
appear responsible for something that they hadn't done,” Tsutakawa confirmed that this was their 
argument.39  
At the end of the meeting, the board suggested placing the memorial sculpture in the 
parking lot, or in a city square—off of fairgrounds property and on public city property. 
Following this suggestion, Tsutakawa, who believed that the sculpture should be in a “nice 
landscaped area” and protected from vandalism, pulled out of the project. However, the JACL 
committee pursued the project, and the fairgrounds board eventually agreed to the construction 
of a memorial on the actual grounds—it is not clear from Tsutakawa’s account exactly what 
pushed them to change their stance. He does relate, however, that he changed the design of the 
memorial to make it “less controversial” following this decision. While his original drawings 
were “very definitely reminiscent of the hardship [of incarcerated Japanese Americans],” he 
explains that:  
At one point, I wasn't so sure whether I wanted to do this or not, knowing and 
understanding the feeling of some of the elements in the state here, I didn't want to stir up 
any more controversy and cause any more hard feelings among these people. So I wanted 
to make the design more universal and less related to the incident itself—the war, the 
relocation, the internment, and the hardship that the Japanese people went through.40  
 
Tsutakawa moved away from an explicit invocation of the incarceration, he claims, because he 
“felt that by repeatedly reminding people of the injustice and the hardship, and the loss to the 
                                               




Japanese people, it was not going to improve anything; you'll just remind them of the bad 
feeling, hard feelings…I decided it should be a more friendly gesture of all the people gathered 
and in harmony, and that's what I made.” The memorial at the site is a cylindrical bronze 
sculpture that depicts silhouettes of men, women, and children with linked hands, with negative 
space between the forms (see Figure 15).41 When asked by the interviewer if he understood the 
memorial as not “specific to Japanese-American relationships at all, but more to any decade or 
incident,” Tsutakawa responded that beyond a plaque at the site that references the history of the 
incarceration, the sculpture itself “has no suggestion” of the events the JACL committee hoped it 
would memorialize.  
 The plaque that accompanies Tsutakawa’s sculpture states that the sculpture “is dedicated 
to the memory of over 7,600 people of Japanese ancestry who were imprisoned on the 
fairgrounds from April to September of 1942,” and additionally includes a quotation from 
Tsutakawa. The quotation reads: “I wanted to depict people of all races and creeds living in 
harmony. Then these sad things won’t be happening over and over again” (see Figure 16). 
Although Tsutakawa expressed in his interview with the Archives of American Art that he 
actively moved away from reminding the viewer of the incarceration, the plaque nonetheless 
portrays his intention with the sculpture as more in line with the typical rhetoric of the 
remembrance movement—invoking the memory of the past for the sake of preventing future 
injustice.  
One final note regarding this memorial concerns Tsutakawa’s use of the word 
“harmony.” The sculpture itself is named “Harmony,” and based on the information included on 
the plaque alone, it would appear as though the piece was so named because Tsutakawa aimed to 
                                               
41 This description is derived from that provided on the memorial plaque at the site. 
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depict universal harmony between persons of different cultures. However, the concentration 
camp at Puyallup was nicknamed “Camp Harmony” by army officials. It seems, based on 
Tsutakawa’s testimony as it is recorded in his interview, that the term was not deployed 
ironically as a form of subtle critique, yet it could easily be read to function in that way.   
 As the case of Puyallup shows, efforts to memorialize these former concentration camps 
can be contentious. In this case, the controversy and “hard feelings” drove Tsutakawa to create a 
memorial that was “less controversial,” ultimately resulting in a memorial that aesthetically and 
thematically had little to do with the hardships of the incarceration, instead depicting a hopeful 
future beyond the discrimination and conflict of the incarceration and even of its remembrance.42 
Inouye’s analysis of the text on the California State Historic Landmark plaque placed at 
Manzanar in the 1970s reveals similar controversy over what memorials are allowed to say with 
regard to state violence and Japanese American victims. She writes that because “The Manzanar 
Committee…was working to commemorate a shameful episode in American history and…it 
even went so far as to conclude the proposed inscription in the words not of an apologetic—and 
thus implicitly benign—government, but of its victims…the committee’s suggested language 
met with resistance from government officials and bureaucrats.”43 In both cases, any reference to 
the hardship or violence of the incarceration is met with resistance, illustrating the difficulty of 
and contestations over memorializing the experiences of Japanese Americans in this spaces. 
Those controlling and managing the land—the Washington State Fair, in the case of Puyallup, or 
the National Park Service, in the case of Manzanar—seek to downplay the state’s victimization 
                                               
42 Regardless of what was ultimately depicted and memorialized with this sculpture, approximately 1,000 members 
of the local Japanese American community attended the memorial’s dedication ceremony at Puyallup in 1983, and 
hundreds traveled to Puyallup in 2017 to recognize the expansion of the landscaping surrounding the memorial. 
43 Inouye, The Long Afterlife of Nikkei Wartime Incarceration, 133. The text on the plaque closes with the phrase 
“Tondemonai!”—“meaning ‘unexpected,’ but also ‘outrageous’ or ‘terrible.’” 
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of citizens and long-time residents in favor of unifying uplift. While this resistance ultimately 
altered the fundamental message of Tsutakawa’s memorial, in the case of Manzanar the 
committee’s fight for the use of “concentration camp” was ultimately successful.  
The Tanforan Assembly Center in San Bruno, California was constructed at the Tanforan 
Racetrack, which burned down in 1964. A shopping center was opened on the site in 1971. At 
the entrance to the mall there is a marker for the “Tanforan Assembly Center Commemorative 
Garden” dedicated in September 2007. The “garden” is more closely described as a low stone 
bench on a small plot of dirt surrounded by large rocks, indistinguishable from other planters 
around the mall’s entrance (see Figure 13). The memorial is overshadowed by an adjacent large 
bronze sculpture of Seabiscuit which memorializes the shopping center’s former life as a 
racetrack. However, in 2016 the Tanforan Assembly Center Memorial Committee based in 
nearby Richmond, California was awarded $363,839 by the National Park Service’s Japanese 
American Confinement Sites grant program to construct a memorial on the “assembly center” 
site in the exterior plaza of the shopping center at the Bay Area Rapid Transit station in San 
Bruno.44 This memorial will include “a bronze statue, inspired by a Dorothea Lange photograph 
showing two girls on their way to Tanforan, interpretive panels, a memorial wall listing the 
names of those held there, and replica horse stalls demonstrating living conditions for some at 
the former thoroughbred racetrack.”45 This new memorial represents a significant shift in the 
scale and thoroughness of the Tanforan memorial, the least developed and seemingly the least 
maintained of the nine memorials I was able to visit. The Japanese American Confinement Sites 
                                               
44 “FY 2016 Grant Awards,” National Park Service: Japanese American Confinement Sites Grant Program. 
https://www.nps.gov/jacs/downloads/2016PROJECT_SUMMARIES.pdf  
45 “FY 2016 Grant Awards,” National Park Service.  
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grant program that is making possible this new expansion will be discussed in further detail later 
in this chapter.  
As is evident, the establishment and maintenance of memorials entails ideological battles 
as well as economic challenges. In addition to the various obstacles to establishing a memorial at 
Puyallup, the aversion to including the phrase “concentration camp” on the plaque at Manzanar, 
and the sorry state of the Tanforan memorial, the memorial plaque at the former Sacramento 
Assembly Center has become so eroded it is illegible (see Figure 2). Moreover, efforts to secure 
monuments at Mayer, Tulare, and Pomona have failed. In the case of public land, it is the 
National Park Service that ultimately has the power to decide whether memorialization efforts 
will be successful and what these sites will say. The Park Service is, then, a premier institution of 
civil religion in America. It is granted the authority to demarcate sacred space and to construct 
the patriotic landscape. As such, its role in curating and mediating the American and Japanese 
American civil religions demands scrutiny.  
 Chidester and Linenthal comment on the role of the National Park Service in sanctioning 
and managing American sacred space. In discussing what is uniquely “American” about 
American sacred space, the authors write that one element is that 
 a distinctive managerial ethos has emerged out of American historical experience to  
 influence the production and preservation of sacred space. Drawing upon a Christian  
 religious ethics of stewardship or custodianship, this management style has especially  
 characterized the sanctification of natural environments and wilderness areas. By placing  
 them under the bureaucratic management of federal agencies—the U.S. Forest Service,  
 the National Park Service—their enduring sanctity has been secured.46 
 
                                               
46 Chidester & Linenthal, American Sacred Space, 27. While I am in agreement with Chidester and Linenthal in 
their evaluation of the National Park Service’s crucial role in producing and preserving American sacred spaces, I 
question their identification of this “managerial ethos” as peculiarly Christian—the question of stewardship or 
custodianship as being characteristic of any one religious tradition I would argue is undecidable.  
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As Chidester and Linenthal note, these services are often used for protective ends in the context 
of wilderness, and they can be seen to function the same way in the case of former incarceration 
sites. As sites intentionally isolated and quickly torn down or reappropriated at the end of the 
war, these spaces were in real danger of being completely erased from the landscape in the 
postwar period. As such, beginning in the 1980s local JACL chapters as well as groups like the 
Manzanar Committee and the Heart Mountain Wyoming Foundation sought protection for these 
sites by pursuing State and National Historic Landmark or Site Status. Manzanar was the first 
site to achieve National Historic Landmark Status, in 1985, and Minidoka was the last to achieve 
a National Historic Site designation in 2008. Of the ten long-term camps, only Jerome in 
Arkansas has no national designation. There exists a monument at the site, as well as remnants of 
the concentration camp including concrete slabs, a hospital smokestack, and a reservoir, but the 
land itself was auctioned off to local farmers after the war, and remains divided under private 
ownership.47 Those sites which are designated and protected are through this title understood to 
have national historical significance, and thus are in a sense included in the American civil 
religious fold.48  
The power of the National Park Service to assign meaning to these spaces and to 
subsume them into the American civil religious fold is significant, but not without limit. 
Iwamura interprets the National Park Service-funded Manzanar Interpretive Center as an attempt 
to “bring the Japanese American community back into the civil religious fold.”49 Iwamura 
explains, “As Sue Embrey, the longtime Manzanar Committee chair seems to concede: ‘The 
                                               
47 “Jerome,” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Jerome/#After_the_War 
48 Interestingly, although Foote does not explicitly acknowledge the link between civil religion and the National 
Park Service, he continually refers to the National Park Service in his chapter entitled “Stigmata of National 
Identity” which “takes up how the American past has been inscribed on landscape,” and is framed as a discussion of 
American civil religion; see Foote 264. 
49 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 954.  
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Interpretive Center is important because it needs to show to the world that America is strong as it 
makes amends for the wrongs it has committed, and that we will always remember Manzanar 
because of that.’”50 Embrey’s comments are interesting in that they position the Center as 
addressing a global audience rather than simply reassuring American citizens that the nation will 
acknowledge and make amends for the wrongs it commits against its own citizens. Nonetheless, 
the NPS agenda did not go unchallenged.  In a footnote, Iwamura writes: “While the Manzanar 
Committee works cooperatively with the National Park Service (NPS) to organize the annual 
pilgrimage, the committee (in its fervent political commitments) and pilgrimage (as a public 
forum and living expression of memory) serve as a critical counterpoint to the NPS focus,”51 
thus differentiating between the vision of the National Park Service and the Japanese American 
community as represented by the Manzanar Committee. Indeed, the significance of these spaces 
continues to shift with changing political contexts. Explaining the significance of a post 9/11 
pilgrimage to Manzanar, Embrey linked the past incarceration to a contemporary incarceration 
also predicated on hysteria and racism: "We need to make sure history doesn't repeat itself. 
Muslim and Arab Americans are being held at Guantanamo Bay without charge or trial. It 
reminds us of the Issei who were also held without charge for many years during WWII.”52 
These sacred spaces do not simply educate contemporary audiences about the past, but can serve 
as a platform for ongoing critique of U.S. domestic and foreign policy, even as the National Park 
Service management attempts to use these sites to convey globally an image of America as 
“mak[ing] amends for the wrongs it has committed.” 
                                               
50 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 954. 
51 Ibid., 965. 
52 Ibid., 954. Regarding this comparison, it must be noted that only one U.S. citizen was held, for a time, in the 
Guantanamo Bay facility. 
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In similar rebuttal of the National Park Service’s curatorial control over Manzanar that 
also entailed a critique of American racist policies of dispossession, Wendi Yamashita argues 
that the violence of the incarceration at Manzanar was long preceded by violence against the 
indigenous population. Indeed, the ability of the government to incarcerate Japanese Americans 
on these lands was predicated upon the previous seizure of these lands from Native American 
populations. Yamashita analyzes the joint efforts of the Manzanar Committee and several 
populations indigenous to California’s Owens Valley, where Manzanar is located, to block the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power’s construction of a 1,200 acre “Solar Ranch” in the 
Owens Valley four miles east of Manzanar in 2014.53 The solar ranch would be visible from 
everywhere within the former concentration camp, now the Manzanar Historic Site operated by 
the National Park Service, altering the site’s viewshed—a vast, uninterrupted, and arid 
landscape. The Manzanar committee argued that this viewshed importantly contributed to the 
sense of isolation felt within the camp.54  
The experience of the unique environmental factors and weather conditions of the camps 
is described in many instances as an important aspect of pilgrimage to former sites of 
incarceration.55 As one example, Warren Furutani and Victor Shibata, who organized the first 
Manzanar pilgrimage in December of 1969 testified to the impact that experiencing the bitter 
cold of the Owens Valley at that time of year had on them.56As Inouye writes, the pilgrimages 
require that “participants experience in a modest way the hardships originally inflicted by 
Executive Order 9066.”57 In addition to the experiential aspect, there is also an educational one. 
                                               
53 Wendi Yamashita, “The Colonial and the Carceral: Building Relationships between Japanese Americans and 
Indigenous Groups in the Owens Valley,” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 1 (2016), 121-138. 
54 Yamashita, “The Colonial and the Carceral,” 122.  
55 See Denshō interviews with Kay Sakai Nakano, Willie K. Ito, and Florence Ohmura Dobashi, among many 
others. 
56 The Manzanar Pilgrimage: A Time for Sharing (Los Angeles: Manzanar Committee, 1981). 
57 Inouye, The Long Afterlife of Nikkei Wartime Incarceration, 128.  
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Yamashita writes that “The disruption to Manzanar’s viewshed by the proposed solar ranch 
project will take away this ability to teach about the fact that Manzanar was chosen as a location 
for Japanese American incarceration as part of ‘a carefully calculated plan by the U.S. 
government to instill a feeling of isolation, desolation, and despair in the minds of those 
incarcerated as a means to control them.’”58 Thus, the committee found that, because the stark 
viewshed helped convey the isolation felt at Manzanar during the war years, it was worth 
protecting.  
According to representatives from the Manzanar Committee and Bishop Paiute and Lone 
Pine Paiute-Shoshone Tribes, construction of the solar ranch would also further “desecrate” the 
Native lands from which the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) had 
already taken water for the city of Los Angeles.59 In her essay, Yamashita includes excerpts from 
an interview with Harry Williams, an elder in the Bishop Paiute Tribe and an environmental 
activist, featured in Nanobah Becker’s film Saving Payahüüpü: The Owens Valley Solar Story. 
Williams describes the destruction of history that the construction of the solar ranch would 
necessitate and draws parallels between the state’s violence against and confinement of the 
indigenous and Japanese American populations. Williams implicitly identifies a two-part 
violence on behalf of the state—an initial theft of property followed by an erasure of history and 
of competing claims to ownership of said property—and draws a parallel between the treatment 
of the indigenous and Japanese American communities by explicitly referring to the 
concentration camps as reservations: “[T]hey interned [Japanese Americans] and put them on 
reservations hidden away. It was no good to steal all their property and take ‘em out of their 
                                               
58 Yamashita, “The Colonial and the Carceral,” 122. 
59 Saving Payahüüya: The Owens Valley Solar Story, Film, directed by Jon Kinney and Geoffrey Bennett Ulrich 
(2014; Los Angeles, CA: Graven Image Films, LLC), YouTube Video. All electricity produced by the LADWP’s 
solar ranch would likewise go directly to the city of Los Angeles. 
 42 
homes and take all their property and put [them]…in captivity…that [experience] stole their lives 
like it did to the tribes.”60  Williams goes on to discuss the impact of the LADWP’s proposed 
solar ranch and the second stage of this state violence. In describing the destruction of history 
that the construction of the solar ranch would necessitate, Williams explains the destruction of 
the multitude of sacred sites in the valley as follows: “[T]hey’re just going to bulldoze ‘em, grade 
‘em all out and ruin it—just kill it, like colonialism does. It destroys your history and rewrites it 
and if they destroy it then you were never there because there’s no proof of you ever being 
there.”61 Williams here makes clear the parallels between the physical erasure entailed in the 
LADWP’s project and the historical erasure of colonialism. He implies that the two work 
together—that following the state’s seizure of or destruction of property, the erasure of any 
physical mark on the landscape or tangible claim to ownership then facilitates a destruction of 
history, as “there’s no proof of you ever being there.”62 The Owens Valley Solar Ranch 
controversy elicited reflection from Japanese Americans and indigenous peoples in the Owens 
Valley who had been, in different ways, confined and dispossessed of their lands and homes by 
the state. Drawing connections between the state’s “colonial” and “carceral” acts of violence 
towards indigenous populations and Japanese Americans, respectively, highlights America’s 
practice of seizing and allocating land to confine and control the marginalized other, and disputes 
the concept of the nation as a unified whole stretching from “sea to shining sea.”  
The likening of the state’s seizure of property to their stealing the lives of Japanese 
Americans and indigenous populations as well as the comparison between historical and physical 
                                               
60 Saving Payahüüpü, Graven Image Films. 
61 Ibid.  
62 The Owens Valley Solar Ranch controversy resulted in increased communication and joint activism between the 
Japanese American and indigenous communities in the Owens Valley. Since 2014, a tribal leader has been included 
in the opening of the Manzanar pilgrimage every year.  
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erasure is evocative of the concept of social death, first referenced in the introduction to this 
paper. Yamashita makes this connection explicit in her analysis of Williams’ words. She writes 
that “[Williams] also makes visible the ways in which the U.S. acquisition of indigenous lands 
and the taking of Japanese American properties are linked to a destruction of history that leads to 
physical and social death. This physical and social death is about erasing indigenous claims to 
land as well as invalidating Japanese American political acts of memory.”63 Moreover, blocking 
memorialization at these sites and constructing new developments on these sites such as 
highways, parks, shopping malls, and solar ranches constitute a renewed threat of social death. 
Memorialization efforts on behalf of activists within the Japanese American community actively 
counter this threat of social death by reinscribing these histories upon the landscape. 
In 2006, there was a prominent development concerning the role of the National Park 
Service in preserving the history of the incarceration: Congress established the Japanese 
American Confinement Sites (JACS) grant program, authorizing up to $38 million “for the 
preservation and interpretation of U.S. confinement sites where Japanese Americans were 
detained during World War II.”64 The National Park Service website for the JACS program 
stipulates that “Grants are awarded to organizations and entities working to preserve historic 
Japanese American confinement sites and their history, including: private nonprofit 
organizations, educational institutions, and state, local, and tribal governments, and other public 
entities”65 The authorized funding is to be used “to identify, research, evaluate, interpret, protect, 
restore, repair, and acquire historic confinement sites in order that present and future generations 
                                               
63 Yamashita, “The Colonial and the Carceral,” 130. The “political acts of memory” that Yamashita refers to above 
are the revisitations to former sites of incarceration. The political nature of the ritual activity of the Days of 
Remembrance and the pilgrimages to various former incarceration sites will be discussed in the next chapter. 
64 “Japanese American Confinement Sites,” The National Park Service, accessed April, 2018. 
https://www.nps.gov/jacs/index.html 
65 “Japanese American Confinement Sites,” National Park Service. Grant awards require a “2:1 Federal to non-
Federal match ($2 Federal to $1 non-Federal match).” 
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may learn and gain inspiration from these sites and that these sites will demonstrate the nation’s 
commitment to equal justice under the law.”66 The program began appropriations in 2009, and 
according to a 2018 NBC article, funding levels have been approximately $2 million per year.67   
This fund is undoubtedly instrumental in preserving these sites and establishing museums 
and educational tools for conveying the history of the incarceration, but it is worth considering 
Iwamura’s understanding of the National Park Service’s curatorial control over these sites as an 
attempt to bring the history of the incarceration into the American civil religious fold at the 
expense of the Japanese American civil religion’s critical nature. In light of the National Park 
Service’s increased involvement in the preservation and management of these sites, it is worth 
asking if anything is lost when the American and Japanese American civil religious claims to 
land are mediated through the same agency. That the National Park Service communicates its 
hope that the JACS program “will demonstrate the nation’s commitment to equal justice under 
the law”68 is reminiscent of Iwamura’s claim, and represents the nation’s attempt to use the 
history of the incarceration in the construction of a “favorable narrative.” Nonetheless, the JACS 
grant program represents the most significant effort on behalf of the government to protect 
former concentration camps and even pledges funding for the acquisition of additional sites that 
are not currently managed by Japanese American remembrance organizations. Considering the 
National Park Service’s previous statement regarding the former site of the Mayer detention 
center in Arizona that “no federal historic recognition is recommended for this property,”69 the 
                                               
66 “Japanese American Confinement Sites,” National Park Service.  
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NBC News, 14 March 2018. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/advocates-fight-save-grant-helps-
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68 “Japanese American Confinement Sites,” National Park Service.    
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willingness to fund the acquisition of new lands suggests a significant shift in the way the 
National Park Service is evaluating these sites.  
Rhys Williams and Chidester and Linenthal all assert that the future challenges to civil 
religion in America will be spatial. One underlying rationalization for this claim is that the 
nation’s borders and the nation state as an entity are less stable and less definable now than when 
Bellah forwarded his theory. As Williams writes, “The concept of civil religion has always 
presumed the nation-state. In Bellah’s formulation or in those of his critics, the nation was 
assumed to be definable, in part because civil religion helped define it.”70 Indeed, we have seen 
how the National Park Service is able to materially construct reference points for a particular 
portrayal of American history through its management of the land. Williams writes that the civil 
religious use of space in defining the nation has been particularly important in America, “often 
thought to be a nation built on principles and ideals rather than birthright and territorial 
inheritance…civil religion was important to national identity and a valuable resource for societal 
cohesion as well as a resource for internal critique and social change.”71 This is close to Bellah’s 
original understanding of the importance of civil religion to an increasingly pluralistic America. 
However, Williams writes that “the neoliberal moment presents a potential crisis for civil 
religion—it destabilizes borders, mixes populations, scrambles cultural heritages, and 
undermines clear presumptions of the authority and boundaries of the nation-state that is civil 
religion’s ultimate referent.”72 The work of the Japanese American community to memorialize 
the incarceration, preserving and publicizing a history that disputes the favorable narrative 
promulgated by the triumphalist monuments of American civil religion, contributes to the 
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instability of American civil religion in this moment. The spaces of a Japanese American civil 
religion do not only present an ideological challenge to the American civil religion. These spaces 
also assert a material challenge to American civil religion and its sacred map. The borders of 
sacred spaces themselves are disputed as contestations over land result in a series of 
resignifications of sacred space.  
In this chapter, I have discussed spatial memorialization (including pilgrimage, 
dedication ceremonies and physical markers), as a means of sacralizing the former sites of 
concentration camps. Together, these sites comprise the Japanese American civil religious 
landscape.  In the next chapter, I examine the ritual calendar or sacred time of the Japanese 




Chapter Two: The 1978 Day of Remembrance and the Rebirth of the Japanese American 
Community 
 
 [W]e were told we were being sent to Puyallup, but Puyallup was known simply as the  
 fairground, we had no clear sense of what would be, what would meet us there…That  
 point at which we were loaded on busses and shipped out, I think that was one of the  
 worse points of our experience for us, in that we got the sense of being, as I say, herded  
 like cattle out of our homes and where we felt we had a right to be.1  
 -Frank Miyamoto 
 
 After we parked the car, as we were walking towards the gathering place, I saw these  
 cowboy trucks and things. I said, ‘That’s what we used to ride in, that’s what you used to  
 do, this and that.’ I just started thinking about all the things and reminded me, and tears  
 started coming out. It was, I think—a sort of healing took place after that, because it  
 reopened old wounds. I think it helped. A lot of people said that was the first time they  
 cried. When they were evacuated, nobody cried. But they were able to think back and  
 cried over it.2  
 -Barbara Yamaguchi 
 
In Catherine Bell’s 1997 work, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, Bell identifies six 
“basic genres of ritual action”—rites of passage, calendrical rites, rites of exchange and 
communion, “feasting, fasting, and festivals,” rites of affliction, and political rites.3 Bell 
contends that these different genres of ritual action serve different purposes. For example, while 
“rites of passage give order and definition to the bicultural life cycle, so calendrical rites give 
socially meaningful definitions to the passage of time, creating an ever-renewing cycle of days, 
months, and years.”4 Calendrical rites are of particular interest in the context of civil religion, as 
an essential component of Robert Bellah’s 1967 theory of American civil religion is his 
conception of an “annual ritual calendar” for the American civil religion.5 In Bellah’s 
formulation, this ritual calendar is comprised most prominently of Memorial Day and 
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Thanksgiving Day, and is supplemented by the “less overtly religious” Fourth of July, as well as 
Washington’s and Lincoln’s birthdays and Veterans Day.6 These days function, Bellah claims, to 
integrate a smaller subset of the nation—be it the town community in the case of Memorial Day 
or the family unit in the case of Thanksgiving—into the national cult.7 Bellah’s exposition of the 
ways in which these days function to connect smaller populations to the nation as a whole under 
a unifying vision is expressed only with regards to Memorial Day. Bellah writes that, “Memorial 
Day observance, especially in the towns and smaller cities of America, is a major event for the 
whole community involving a rededication to the martyred dead, to the spirit of sacrifice, and to 
the American vision.”8 Integrative events like these are crucial to Bellah’s understanding of 
American civil religion as a unifying force, as moments of national unity that facilitate the 
extension of the “felt nation”9 to communities and individuals.  
 This line of argument, however, has been scrutinized by critics of the theory of American 
civil religion. José Santiago argues that, “the simple existence of popular worship, public liturgy, 
and political ritual does not provide any information regarding their function or effects on social 
integration.”10 Bryan Turner similarly contends that “[M]ost civil-religion arguments or 
arguments concerning nationalism are weak theories which point to the presence of certain 
allegedly common practices and suggest that these have integrative consequences…”11 In 
essence, these critics argue that the presence of a national ritual calendar is not enough to create 
unity. Santiago’s and Turner’s points are well-taken—it is difficult to evaluate the integrative 
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power of these events, i.e. to what extent the martyred dead are on the minds of those Americans 
taking time off from work on Memorial Day, and to what extent this reminds them of their 
inclusion within the American body politic. More relevant to this project, it is difficult to assert 
that Memorial Day celebrations reach the majority of the population or similarly impact all 
subsets of the population. I suggest that if, as Turner and Santiago suggest, it is the case that 
American civil religious holidays do not have the unifying power Bellah attributes to them, this 
may be due, in part, to the presence of dissenting or alternative civil religions within America.  
 Jane Iwamura advocates for an understanding of “the United States [as] home to many 
civil religions,”12 (emphasis in original) largely articulated by marginalized communities.13 
“[T]he dominant culture,” Iwamura argues, “fails to recognize the ways in which these groups 
have developed their own sets of rituals, symbols, and beliefs both from historical experience 
and spiritual necessity and markedly their own integrity and resourcefulness.”14 In the context of 
a ritual calendar for the American civil religion, I contend that the efficacy of the dates identified 
by Bellah in unifying the nation is undermined and diminished by competing ritual calendars for 
which the “dominant culture”—and Bellah’s theory—do not account. In this chapter, I analyze 
the most important date in the Japanese American civil religion’s annual ritual calendar, 
February 19th anniversary of the issuing of Executive Order 9066 (the government action that 
stripped Japanese Americans of their civil liberties and fundamental human rights). Although the 
February 19th date is consistently utilized for ceremonies to dedicate monuments and memorials 
at former sites of incarceration, I will primarily focus on the annual rite of the Day of 
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Remembrance, an event held as near as possible to February 19 each year to observe the signing 
of the Executive Order.15 The Days of Remembrance do not necessarily take place in fixed 
spaces—the location changes with the years and often take place in “secular” sites entirely 
unrelated to the incarceration.  Nonetheless, the events associated with this Day have functioned 
to build understanding across generations, revitalize the community, and rededicate the 
community to collective goals and values. Over the course of this project, I will discuss three 
iterations of this event as it occurred in 1978, 1998, and 2018. In this chapter, I focus on the first 
Day of Remembrance in 1978.  
 Interestingly, the first Day of Remembrance took place not on the February 19th 
anniversary of Executive Order 9066, but on November 25, 1978, over Thanksgiving weekend. 
(The date for the event was switched to February 19th the following year.) In this first year, the 
impact that holding the event on February 19th would have was recognized, and organizer Henry 
Miyatake pushed for this date.16 However, Miyatake remarked in an interview with Denshō that 
the primary architect of the event, Frank Chin, argued that “‘We can't wait that long. There's a 
election coming on.’ And we got to bring this to the forefront. Just the subject itself, we got to 
bring this to the attention of the individuals.”17 In this sense, the first Day of Remembrance had 
an explicitly political intention. The intention was to push the Congressional candidates for 
Washington’s 7th district to publicly announce their commitment to Japanese American 
redress.18 The event was organized by the Seattle Evacuation Redress Committee (SERC), an ad 
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hoc committee of the Seattle chapter of the Japanese American Citizen’s League (JACL). SERC 
was very active in the 1970s, driving the redress movement in Seattle. By the end of 1973, the 
committee had formulated a proposal for individual reparations payments to those affected by 
exclusion orders during World War II, primarily authored by Henry Miyatake. This proposal, 
commonly known as the Seattle Plan, was likely the first proposal for individual reparations.19 
SERC additionally focused on the repeal of Executive Order 9066, finding success in 1976 when 
President Gerald Ford rescinded the order on its February 19th anniversary. The Day of 
Remembrance in 1978, however, was arguably the most consequential event in this early redress 
movement.  
 The profound impact of the event, as Yasuko Takezawa argues, is attributable to the 
event’s unusual format as a reenactment of the forced evacuation to the Puyallup fairgrounds in 
1942.20 The day’s program was primarily planned by Chinese American playwright Frank Chin. 
Chin teamed up with a former Sansei actor, Frank Abe, and approached SERC with the idea to 
stage a reenactment of the evacuation at a time when SERC was contemplating “some kind of 
‘dramatic action’”21 to take advantage of the momentum and attention the redress movement had 
achieved and received. Posters were distributed that mimicked the format of the Civilian 
Exclusion Orders posted throughout communities in 1942 that informed Japanese American 
families of their exclusion from their neighborhoods and mandated that they report to their listed 
Civil Control Station. The event posters were printed over replicas of these notices,22 and 
additionally read: “To all persons of Japanese ancestry and Friends, The Memory of One 
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Hundred Twenty Thousand Three Hundred and Thirteen Issei, Nisei, Sansei and others of 
Japanese ancestry request the pleasure of your company for a Day of Remembrance.”23 The 
collective memory of the incarceration is made active here, presented as an embodied force with 
the power to invite participation in this rite. Participants gathered at Sick’s Stadium in Seattle 
over Thanksgiving weekend, a holiday that Bellah identifies as one of the primary American 
civil religious calendrical rites. At Sick’s Stadium, participants were given mock identification 
tags, like those with which they had been forced to label both themselves and their luggage 
throughout the evacuation process. Families wrote their wartime identification numbers on their 
tags and wore them throughout the proceedings. The participants then reenacted the process of 
caravanning to Puyallup, driving approximately 300 cars and buses escorted by military trucks.24 
Once they arrived at the former incarceration site, they entered the fairgrounds through barbed 
wire.  
 The detailed adherence to reenactment was largely attributable to Frank Chin’s vision. In 
his account of Seattle’s redress movement, Robert Shimabukuro writes that Chin, Abe, and 
Asian American Theater Workshop member Kathy Wong “…treated the Day of Remembrance 
(DOR), as they called it, as an elaborate play to be produced.”25 Henry Miyatake said of working 
with Chin on the Day of Remembrance, “Frank felt that it was all coming together in a way. 
Frank is like a screenwriter. He wants to write a script, and he wants everybody to follow the 
script. And here he's doing the direction of this whole process.”26 In a sense, the 1978 Day of 
Remembrance presents itself as a highly interactive and participant-dependent form of political 
theater. Theories of political theater advocate for an understanding of “theater’s relevance to the 
                                                        
23 Takezawa, Breaking the Silence, 1.  
24 Ibid., 2.  
25 Shimabukuro, Born in Seattle, 42.  
26 “Henry Miyatake Interview,” Denshō Digital Archive.  
  
53 
social sphere—as a forum for public debate, a gauge of national aspirations, an enactment of 
social critique, and a space for imagining alternatives.”27 Chin, Abe, and Wong brought their 
backgrounds in theater to, in essence, stage a public performance of the evacuation and 
incarceration, and in doing so were able to demonstrate the reality of the incarceration and the 
aliveness of its memory to the media and to the public. 
 The explicitly theatrical nature of this ritual makes a performance model of analyzing 
ritual particularly useful here, and furthermore illustrates the potential affinity of religious ritual 
and theatrical performance. As Bell writes, performance models “suggest active rather than 
passive roles for ritual participants who reinterpret value-laden symbols as they communicate 
them.”28 In retrieving identification tags and re-inscribing family numbers onto these tags, in re-
assembling and re-boarding army trucks and buses to caravan to Puyallup, participants in the 
1978 Day of Remembrance exercised a great deal of agency in their interactions with the 
symbols of their incarceration, and in doing so were able to re-forge associations with these 
symbols. Considering this ritual as a political endeavor within the redress movement, the 1978 
Day of Remembrance additionally functioned as a platform for critique and social change. The 
performance of the evacuation and incarceration process represents a seizure of history by the 
Seattle Japanese American community in their attempt to reckon with their past and influence the 
trajectory of their future. Bell would identify this type of ritual behavior as “ritual as a 
performative medium for social change,” which, she argues, “emphasizes human creativity and 
physicality: ritual does not mold people; people fashion rituals that mold their world.”29 The 
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1978 Day of Remembrance presents a striking example of a re-interpretation of symbols by 
participants in an attempt to “mold their world” past, present, and future. 
 Frank Chin, Frank Abe, and Kathy Wong also brought the very important element of 
publicity to the redress movement and Day of Remembrance. Chin came to Seattle initially to 
research and write a story on redress for Seattle Weekly. While in Seattle, Chin was asked by a 
producer of ABC’s primetime journalism program, 20/20, if he had any ideas for a story for a 
“slow Thanksgiving weekend.”30 Chin pitched the idea first to ABC, then to SERC, and began 
planning the “elaborate play” with Frank Abe and Kathy Wong immediately. Robert 
Shimabukuro describes the 47-day planning period of the first Day of Remembrance as 
somewhat hectic due to the fact that “This production had no script, no confirmed site, and a 
really iffy live audience.”31 Shimabukuro argues that the success of the event relied upon Chin’s 
energy, the SERC’s organizational experience, and the possibility of getting a story about redress 
and the incarceration on a nationally televised program.32 According to Henry Miyatake, on the 
day of the event, “all the three TV stations covered it. They gave it primetime display. And the 
TV production people were there in full force. I mean, they must have used six cameras. And 
they covered the event, the program, down at Puyallup very carefully.”33 
 Press coverage before and after the event was likewise thorough. Shimabukuro writes 
that, “In the days leading up to the Day of Remembrance, the newspapers in Seattle, Tacoma, 
Auburn, Bellevue, and local neighborhoods ran major articles on the event…The press coverage 
was no accident. Frank Chin, Frank Abe, and Kathy Wong had put a lot of effort into the press 
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kits.”34 On November 12, 1978, the Seattle Times ran two pieces on the upcoming Day of 
Remembrance. The first was simply a brief and informative notice informing readers of the Day 
of Remembrance at Puyallup “to mark the forcible detainment of 7,200 local [Seattle-area] 
Japanese-Americans during World War II,”35 and providing details regarding the times at which 
one could expect the caravan to leave Sick’s Stadium and arrive in Seattle, and what one could 
expect at Puyallup—“A program of speakers and entertainment.”36 Other than the caravan, the 
provocative nature of this event as a reenactment is not mentioned. That is not to say that the 
coverage in the Seattle Times softened the intention of or logic behind the event. In another piece 
run on the same day written by Shosuke Sasaki, one of the key members of the SERC whom 
Frank Chin allegedly referred to as “the conscience of the group,”37 Sasaki explains the redress 
effort in very direct terms. Sasaki writes, “It is time that Americans of Japanese ancestry 
repudiate the pseudo-American doctrine, promoted by white racists and apparently believed by 
some Nisei, that there is one kind of Americanism for whites and another kind for non-whites.”38 
Rather than ascribing to the form of Americanism deemed appropriate for them by the white 
majority, Sasaki advocates that redress is the necessary avenue toward inclusion: 
 No amount of docile submission to white officials or “demonstrations of loyalty” to the  
 United States by Nisei ever can disprove the false accusations in the minds of most white  
 Americans. That can be done only when the government of the United States publicly  
 declares that the wartime uprooting and imprisonment of Japanese Americans was totally  
 without justification, and awards the victims proper and reasonable redress.39  
 
The day after the Day of Remembrance, the Seattle Times ran several lengthier pieces on the Day 
of Remembrance and the injustice of the incarceration, including many photos from the event. 
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One such piece interviewed Gordon Hirabayashi and sought to portray his perspective on the 
redress movement. Hirabayashi, a Japanese American professor of sociology who had spoken at 
the Day of Remembrance, was well known as one of three men who had resisted the curfew and 
exclusion orders and challenged the constitutionality of the incarceration at the level of the 
Supreme Court. Hirabayashi laments that “even today some Japanese-Americans are reluctant ‘to 
rock the boat and shake attention toward us,’” claiming that “We’ll get catcalls…but all 
citizenship activity confronts this.”40 That Hirabayashi assumes that an attempt at inclusion and 
equal consideration within the American citizenry will be met with resistance is telling of the 
way that this nation—the civil religion of which Bellah describes as a “tradition of openness, 
tolerance, and ethical commitment”41—has in reality treated him. This calls into question the 
proclaimed values of the nation within which the Japanese American community seeks inclusion 
with their activism. Hirabayashi’s critique of the nation is even more visible in the context of the 
1998 Day of Remembrance, and will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
 Another Seattle Times piece profiles three women incarcerated at Puyallup who returned 
for the Day of Remembrance in 1978. One of these women, Dorothy Morisaki, tells her family’s 
story of separation and the degrading circumstances into which they were forced by the 
conditions of the incarceration. The article opens by stating that “The vision of a tiny baby being 
passed between strands of a barbed-wire fence is a memory that will never leave Dorothy 
Morisaki,”42 and the image is certainly a striking one. Morisaki explains that her pregnant sister 
had been allowed to remain in a hospital to give birth to her baby at the time of the evacuation, 
and upon arriving to the camp later, was assigned to live in a different area. Morisaki remembers 
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that, “‘My mother wanted to hold her grandchild but that guard wouldn’t open the gate. We had 
to pass this little baby between the wires.’ … ‘This is what I remember. It was so degrading, so 
humiliating,’ she said.”43 The event thus brought to light many intimate details of the 
incarceration as well as contemporary opinions from prominent activists regarding the redress 
movement, garnering exactly the type of press coverage and attention the organizers wanted.  
 Yasuko Takezawa argues that it was due to the press coverage that “[The Day of 
Remembrance] left a strong impression not only on the more than two thousand participants but 
throughout the local Japanese American community and in other such communities across the 
nation.”44 Subsequent Day of Remembrance events on February 19th, 1979 in Los Angeles, 
Portland, and San Francisco, Takezawa argues, were inspired by “[t]he publicity and the direct 
persuasion of the Seattle redress committee.”45 In 1979, Seattle Times articles addressing 
“remembrance” and “Japanese Americans” appear with much greater frequency, and 
advertisements and discussions of public remembrance events, as well as profiles and research-
based pieces on institutions and individuals within the Japanese American community are easy to 
locate from 1978 onwards. The language surrounding the incarceration in these pieces varies. In 
1978, the incarceration is often referred to as “wartime detainment,” but in 1978 as well a Seattle 
Times editor’s note accompanying Shosuke Sasaki’s piece uses the term “incarceration.” In 
1979, a piece written by Japanese American attorney Ron Mamiya uses “imprisonment” and 
“concentration camps” in reference to the incarceration. The majority of pieces relevant to 
remembrance in 1979, however, use “internment” and “internment camp.”46  
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 Takezawa’s most striking claim about the first Day of Remembrance in 1978 is that it 
“burst open the tomb of Japanese American history.”47 That is to say, this event “broke the 
silence” following the incarceration and opened pathways of dialogue between generations, 
between Japanese American communities, and between Japanese Americans and their 
government. Takezawa attributes the success of the first Day of Remembrance in 
commemorating the incarceration and “breaking the silence” to “the cultural reconstruction of 
the past.”48 Here Takezawa relies on the work of sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt, who theorizes (in 
Takezawa’s words) that, “intellectuals in modern societies reconstruct traditions to formulate 
collective identity and to integrate emerging groups within a common institutional framework. 
He argues that certain traditional symbols are transposed to create new central symbols and that 
the members of the group or society…accept these symbols ‘as the major collective referents of 
their personal identity.’”49 In the context of Japanese American redress and remembrance, 
Takezawa argues that “certain symbols, derived from past experience” such as barbed wire, most 
prominently, are employed “to link personal identity to collective identity.”50 The reenactive 
nature of the Day of Remembrance—through its use of evacuation-style posters, mock 
identification tags, military trucks, and barbed wire—effectively invoked specific symbols of the 
incarceration that, taken together, serve to reconstruct the past. According to Takezawa, to 
encounter these symbols years later enabled participants in the Day of Remembrance to form a 
collective identity based on the past experience of incarceration at Puyallup. These symbols, 
previously evoking the destruction and incarceration of the Japanese American community, are 
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re-worked here to reconstruct a collective identity and build unity, and in that sense are 
reclaimed and reversed by the 1978 Day of Remembrance. Takezawa writes,  
It was through ritualized reconstruction employing powerful symbols that the memories 
of the experiences were brought to the surface and then made the basis of collective 
identity. It is in this process that Japanese Americans were able to realize and confirm 
that their bitterness and suffering were collective. The sense of suffering, which 
previously dominated the subconscious core of the individual identity, thus became the 
core of the Japanese American collective identity.51 
 
It is the use of symbols, in part, that lends this reconstruction its ritualistic nature. As Catherine 
Bell writes, “Activities that generate and express the sacral significance of key symbols like the 
flag [here, barbed wire is a good example of an equivalent symbol] are often considered to be 
ritual-like.”52 According to Bell, this is because “with regard to objects as sacred symbols, their 
sacrality is the way in which the object is more than the mere sum of its parts and points to 
something beyond itself, thereby evoking and expressing values and attitudes associated with 
larger, more abstract, and relatively transcendent ideas.”53 Here, the 1978 organizers deployed 
former artifacts of the incarceration as symbols to evoke a sense of collective experience and 
identity. Symbols like barbed wire, identification tags, and army trucks were used to critique the 
unlawful incarceration by the state by highlighting the dehumanizing and forceful nature of the 
evacuation process. Organizers were able to “generate and express” the meaning of these and 
evoke the memories that accompanied them through this reenactment. Takezawa’s argument 
here about the central importance of symbols is well-supported by the testimonies of participants 
in the 1978 Day of Remembrance.  
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 Poet Lawson Inada wrote of 1978 in Puyallup that “It was the largest gathering of 
Japanese Americans since the camps.”54 Organizer Henry Miyatake thought that one of the 
greatest successes of the first Day of Remembrance was that it was able to bring Seattle’s 
Japanese American community together. Miyatake remarked in his interview with Denshō that in 
doing so, the event cut across different identifying groups within the community: “It's not just 
JACL, or Nisei vets, or one of the churches…everybody was there. So it was a collective 
experience for everybody.”55 This was particularly important, Miyatake claims, because of the 
way in which the government had divided the community through the incarceration. Miyatake 
said, “[T]he government did a lot of things to us that separated us as groups of individuals, the 
Isseis from the Niseis… And it separated the community itself, separated the families. And the 
parents wouldn't talk about this whole experience…But it enabled them to at least come together 
and see the stuff, and people talk about it openly and discuss the issues.”56 In this sense, the Day 
of Remembrance in 1978 began the process of repairing the damage the government had done to 
the Japanese American community through the incarceration by reopening lines of 
communication and affording a sense of a Japanese American community.  
 Barbara Yamaguchi’s reaction to the first Day of Remembrance quoted at the very 
beginning of this chapter57 illustrates the emotional release triggered by these symbols of the 
incarceration. This release, she believes, initiated a healing delayed by at least 30 years. Similar 
discussions of healing and of being liberated to reckon with the past after the first Day of 
Remembrance are found in many accounts as participants comment on their family’s history 
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being “[brought] to life.”58 Frank Chin recalled Shosuke Sasaki’s reaction to the Day of 
Remembrance after they had returned to Seattle: “I haven’t set foot on those premises since the 
days it was Camp Harmony. And, much to my surprise, all the horrible feelings and memories I 
expected to assail me there were of no matter. Standing there by the grandstand, alone with 
Henry [Miyatake] tonight, I found to be the strangest elation…’”59 Sasaki goes on to elaborate, 
“It wasn’t until I was standing there tonight that I really felt released from camp. I think it was 
because I went there of my own free will.”60 Sasaki’s comment illustrates that although some 
chose not to attend the Day of Remembrance at Puyallup because they had been forced into the 
fairgrounds once and did not want to return,61 for others, the return to Puyallup in this form 
constituted an emotionally liberating reclamation of agency. 
 The “breaking open” of the Day of Remembrance—this new freedom to heal and 
confront the past—especially impacted familial and intergenerational relationships. Many 
participants from older and younger generations alike describe the day as one that opened lines 
of communication within family units. Miyatake was surprised by this development, as he had 
always communicated with his children about his own experience. In his interview with Denshō, 
however, Miyatake commented that Frank Chin “knew that this would be a earthshaking event 
for the families that participated.”62 Miyatake describes the conversations he heard after the Day 
of Remembrance:  
 [I]t was a tremendous success on getting the community together…some of the people  
 would say, ‘That was the first time I ever talked to my children about the camps, when  
 we were driving on the caravan down to Puyallup’…And for them it was a kind of a… 
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 grand opening for the kids to get at least exposed to this information—and the fact that  
 the parents were even now talking about it…there were a lot of stories about that.63  
 
For the younger generations that had not experienced the incarceration, the symbols of the 
reenactment could still be powerful. Doi includes David Hayama’s reflection on interacting with 
his father who had been incarcerated at the Day of Remembrance. Hayama stated that: 
 What impressed me the most was that my father was there and he is a very quiet man, a  
 very solitary man. I went up and got a name tag for him, and it really meant something to  
 me to acknowledge to him that I understand what you went through…I guess that really  
 did, when I think about [it], bring to life that this was a tragic moment in the history of  
 Japanese Americans, for my parents and grandparents.64  
 
The context of the Day of Remembrance enabled Hayama to exchange a meaningful moment 
with his father even without speaking. The space for the younger generation to express interest or 
understanding towards their parents was perhaps new to many, yet important for dialogue. 
Cherry Kinoshita, who attended in 1978, explained that she never spoke to her son about her 
experience because he didn’t ask her, “and you don't force this kind of thing on a person.”65 In 
attending the Day of Remembrance, members of the younger generation like Hayama were able 
to share “momentous interaction[s]” with their families and were also able to identify their own 
and their families’ positions within a greater Japanese American narrative. Hayama’s reaction to 
the Day of Remembrance reveals the power of the event and its symbolism in constructing a 
sense of collective identity by providing individuals with a shared experience. Takezawa writes 
that, “This ritualistic event also created the sense of ‘togetherness’ among the participants, and 
for the first time since the war as many as two thousand Japanese Americans, with their non-
Japanese friends, gathered at one place to share a common experience.”66 As participants re-
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66 Takezawa, Breaking the Silence, 163.  
  
63 
encountered the artifacts of the incarceration in a new way—as symbols in this community rite—
their participation forged a collective memory associated with these symbols that was previously 
unattainable. Prior to the first Day of Remembrance, the community’s social death meant that 
individuals were alone in their memories, of which they rarely spoke.  
 Joanne Doi does well to contextualize the first Day of Remembrance within the redress 
movement while noting the emotional impact of the event. While Doi identifies the 1978 Day of 
Remembrance as a catalyst and turning point in the movement for redress, she claims that the 
event derived this power from its emotional impact. Doi contends that through the Day of 
Remembrance and similar events, “the community garnered the emotional commitment to 
engage in the campaign for redress,”67 as the event provided a space for intergenerational 
dialogue and allowed Japanese Americans to “inhabit the shadowed ground of internment.” The 
very first Day of Remembrance, Doi claims, “highlighted the essence of the redress movement 
which was ‘the healing of wounds through confronting the injustice,’ and not simply about 
monetary payment.”68 Doi argues that the Days of Remembrance (and pilgrimages) “continue to 
this day in response to the continued spiritual need for the healing of the wounds of both persons 
and communities.”69 The tradition has indeed continued for 40 years since 1978, and the memory 
of the injustice of the incarceration continues to be reinvoked annually on the anniversary of the 
Executive Order. 
 At the same time, some expressed negative opinions about this first event. Shimabukuro 
notes that to organizers within the SERC, it seemed that backlash came primarily from Japanese 
Americans “fearful of once again triggering anti-Japanese emotions.”70 Shimabukuro includes a 
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testimony from one organizer, Aki Kurose, who commented that “I had one friend saying, ‘I’m 
not going to go. Why should we all gather there?’ And she said, ‘They’ll say, ‘This is a Jap 
invasion.’’ And so there were some that were fearful of a reunion.”71 Others simply did not want 
to return to the site where they had formerly been incarcerated. One woman, Kathy Hashimoto, 
recounts her uncle’s response to her invitation that he join her and her mother at the event: “He 
looked at me like I was crazy. ‘Are you kidding me? I went to Puyallup once. I never want to see 
that place again.’”72 On a larger scale, political divisions remained between organizations within 
the Japanese American community. Following the 1978 Day of Remembrance, tensions between 
the Seattle chapter of the JACL and the national leadership of the JACL increased when the 
national leadership decided to pursue legislation that would investigate the incarceration rather 
than seek individual reparations payments, as SERC and the Seattle JACL had sought to do for 
several years.73 
 One aspect of the first Day of Remembrance that deserves being called to attention here 
is the boldly critical nature of this first event. To reproduce down to the details the process of 
forced evacuation within a community that had in many respects remained silent about the 
trauma of incarceration for decades was an unprecedented endeavor. Initially, however, the event 
was envisioned as even more provocative—Frank Abe wrote that, “Early on, Chin suggested a 
protest where we’d chain ourselves to the fence at Puyallup,” but “Henry [Miyatake] wouldn’t 
go for it…the whole event was planned not as a protest but as a family event…how can you 
picket a potluck? It was a very conscious, strategic decision.”74 Indeed, after the event Frank 
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Chin noted that “The atmosphere was more picnic than political and the feeling all around was 
downright affectionate.”75 The radical bent of the Seattle area activists is furthermore visible 
beyond this first Day of Remembrance. Several articles from 1979 report on a planned Day of 
Remembrance to Minidoka, where most Seattle area Japanese Americans had been incarcerated, 
that was in part organized by Frank Chin. The event was cancelled due to an internal rift over 
plans to construct and burn down a replica of the Minidoka guard tower. The group of Seattle-
area Japanese Americans intending to travel to Minidoka planned to “build and burn a 25-foot-
tall guard tower, identical to those used by armed guards at the camp from 1942 to 1946 when 
West Coast Japanese-Americans were detained there.”76 This demonstration, again invoking a 
powerful symbol of the state’s oppression during the wartime incarceration, explicitly rebukes 
the state’s narrative of the “military necessity” of the incarceration and asserts a counter narrative 
that emphasizes and rebukes the state’s violence. However, in the case of the Minidoka 
demonstration, the Seattle Times reports that “criticism by Idaho Japanese-Americans and the 
national Japanese-American Citizens League” stemming from fears “that the symbolic burning 
of a guard tower would be too militant and aggressive, and might invite bitterness” prevented 
such an explicit critique.77 In both cases—Puyallup in 1978 and Minidoka in 1979—radical ideas 
were rejected for the sake of constituting shared memory and identity and eventually securing 
redress. Dr. Minoru Masuda, who had been incarcerated at Minidoka and planned to take part in 
the demonstration that summer, commented that this visit to Minidoka would help participants to 
“make final peace with the evacuation,” and said of the Japanese American residents in Idaho 
and the JACL, “What they want is to be good, quiet, obedient Americans who don’t put 
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themselves out front in a demonstration.”78 Masuda’s perspective here is reminiscent of 
Hirabayashi’s claim that “all citizenship activity confronts [resistance].” What is evident is a rift 
between those within the community who were willing to vocalize this reality and combat the 
resistance, and those who were not. 
 As was noted previously, the Day of Remembrance has changed significantly over time 
with regards to its structure and focus. As such, it would be useful to summarize the essential 
characteristics of the first Day of Remembrance in Puyallup in 1978 before moving on to discuss 
the first national Day of Remembrance in Washington, D.C. 20 years later. The Puyallup Day of 
Remembrance was oriented toward reconstituting family and community ties, and through these 
efforts, toward political change. Although Frank Chin described the atmosphere as “more picnic 
than political,” it was precisely because the event succeeded in bringing out shared emotions and 
constructing a collective identity. The event was crucial in garnering publicity for the redress 
movement and inspiring similar processes of remembrance in other communities. This first Day 
of Remembrance repaired family ties, community ties, and served as a linkage between Japanese 
American communities on the West Coast.  
 The Day of Remembrance as it was performed in 1978 stands out within the tradition of 
these ceremonies, and indeed within a Japanese American civil religion in its entirety for its 
unmatched deployment of and reinterpretation of the symbols of state violence and oppression.  
The use of these symbols reconstituted Japanese American individual and collective memories.  
In doing so, it afforded the community a social rebirth and mobilization as a political body.  I 
find Takezawa’s claim that the 1978 Day of Remembrance “burst open the tomb of Japanese 
American history” to be the most accurate explanation of the significance of the event. An event 
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like the 1978 Day of Remembrance that leaned on the power of theater and performance to bring 
participants face to face with painful symbols from the past was necessary to create the space for 
incarcerees to create new significance for these symbols and in doing so, begin to reshape the 
world in which they lived.  
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Chapter Three: Oppression and Iconization: Negotiations of National Identity at The First 
National Day of Remembrance 
 
 This whole day is underlining the importance of not only the pledge but the will and  
 commitment of people to live by certain standards...this day should be remembered like  
 the 4th of July for us in terms of what America means to us. And if we could make that a  
 living pledge, this country will be great.1 
 - Gordon Hirabayashi 
 
 We have 120,000 Americans who are ethnic Japanese who were interned during World  
 War II without due process...and really this day belongs to them because they say what is  
 great about America in the sense that they were willing to persevere and they were  
 willing to suffer the humiliation of incarceration because of their race and it’s my hope  
 that this day will be remembered and that we’ll continue it every year.2 
 - Representative Robert T. Matsui  
 
 Ten years after the first Day of Remembrance at Puyallup, redress was achieved in the 
form of the 1988 Civil Liberties Act in which the government issued a formal apology for the 
incarceration, awarded each surviving incarceree $20,000 in reparations payment, and 
established a fund for the purpose of educating the public about the incarceration. Ten years after 
the passage of the Civil Liberties Act, the educational fund established by the act, the Civil 
Liberties Public Education Fund, organized the first national Day of Remembrance in 
Washington, D.C. This event represents the next iteration of the Day of Remembrance ceremony 
that I will closely analyze to discern the change in the ceremony over time. Director and 
producer Gayle Yamada recorded the ceremony and produced a film, “Day of Remembrance: 
The First National Ceremony,” from which I derive most of my information about this event. A 
formal event in an indoor auditorium in Washington, D.C. with a full program of speakers, 
including politicians, intellectuals, and activists, this iteration of the February 19th ceremony was 
a far cry from the 1978 reenactment at the Puyallup fairgrounds. Nonetheless, the political and 
                                               
1 Gayle Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony, Film, directed by Gayle Yamada (1999; El 
Macera, CA: Bridge Media, Incorporated), VHS.  
2 Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony. 
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religious nature of the event should not be understated. The first Day of Remembrance at 
Puyallup was both politically oriented and community oriented, asking that members of both the 
government and the Japanese American community remember the incarceration. Through this 
rite, the Japanese American community was afforded a social rebirth that allowed them to 
emerge as a political body. At the national Day of Remembrance in 1998, the Civil Liberties 
Public Education Fund (CLPEF) as a representative of this body called for not only its own 
community members but also the American public to remember the incarceration. In addition to 
physically situating the event in the American civil religious sacred center of the nation, the 
event called for national attention through the use of three nationally-broadcast public service 
announcements produced by Gayle Yamada. These PSAs, screened at the event, will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 In this chapter, I primarily focus on the rhetoric of this 1998 event as it pertains to 
participants’ conceptions of and critiques of America and their role and position as citizens after 
incarceration and the securing of redress. Voices within and beyond the Japanese American 
community as presented at this event speak to the ways in which Japanese Americans at the time 
negotiated their place in the nation as a political body and community. With the 1998 
ceremony’s explicitly national orientation came a great deal of discussion about the values and 
benefits of America and American society, as well as discussions of where Japanese Americans 
and the history of the incarceration stood in relation to the nation. Yamada’s recording of this 
event captures a multitude of voices speaking to the afterlife of the incarceration, the duties of 
Japanese Americans in remembering the incarceration, and the meaning of America. Captured in 
the recording of this event are the strains of dissent and divergent opinions within the 
remembrance movement. I evaluate the rhetoric and critical nature of this event to illuminate 
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continuities and changes between this 1998 iteration and the first Day of Remembrance in 1978. 
Tracking the variation between the 1978 and 1998 Days of Remembrance as iterations of the 
same calendrical rite reveals sacred time as lifted out yet nonetheless subject to the influence and 
impact of politics and historical context. I turn now to a discussion of the event itself, and the 
agency organizing this Day of Remembrance, the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund.  
That the 1998 Day of Remembrance called upon the American public to remember the 
incarceration was in keeping with the intent of the CLPEF as described in the language of the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988. The CLPEF was one of two government agencies, along with the 
Office of Redress Administration, established by the act. Dale Minami, chair of the board at the 
time of the national Day of Remembrance, describes the purpose of the CLPEF as follows: 
“…[T]o sponsor research and public educational activities so the events surrounding the 
exclusion, the forced removal, and internment of civilians and permanent residents of Japanese 
ancestry will be remembered, and so the causes and circumstances of this and similar events may 
be illuminated.”3 The Denshō encyclopedia entry for this agency emphasizes its role in public 
education—while the Office of Redress Administration managed financial reparations to 
individual incarcerees, the CLPEF managed funds allocated to finance educational projects 
including research fellowships on topics related to the incarceration, the establishment of 
monuments and landmarks, and events like the national Day of Remembrance, intended “to call 
national attention to this landmark event [the signing of Executive Order 9066].”4  
                                               
3 Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony.  
4 “Civil Liberties Public Education Fund,” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Civil_Liberties_Public_Education_Fund/ Among CLPEF grant recipients were the 
Manzanar Committee and the National Japanese American Memorial Foundation, entities involved with the 
management and creation of two sites under the purview of the National Park Service.   
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 Situated as it was in the nation’s capital, the national orientation of the 1998 Day of 
Remembrance was not only utilized to call upon the American public in its entirety but also lent 
the event a certain political significance. As such, it is worthwhile to revisit Catherine Bell’s 
basic genres of ritual action at this juncture. As an iteration of the calendrical rite in question, the 
Days of Remembrance, the 1998 event is unique in that it was sponsored, organized, and 
executed by the CLPEF, a government agency. In this sense, the 1998 national ceremony spans 
genres of ritual action as a calendrical rite and, arguably, a political rite. Political rituals, 
according to Bell, “comprise those ceremonial practices that specifically construct, display, and 
promote the power of political institutions…or the political interests of distinct constituencies 
and subgroups.”5 As suggested by this excerpt, Bell’s discussion of political rites focuses on the 
use of ritual to display and build power and to re-emphasize and solidify the political platforms 
or perspectives of specific groups. The CLPEF, created in 1988 as a product of securing redress, 
represents a prominent Japanese American political agency, the likes of which did not exist 
before the social revitalization and reconstitution of the community in 1978.  
Bell contends that, “In general, political rites define power in a two-dimensional way: 
first, they use symbols and symbolic action to depict a group of people as a coherent and ordered 
community based on shared values and goals; second, they demonstrate the legitimacy of these 
values and goals by establishing their iconicity with the perceived value and order of the 
cosmos.”6 The extent to which the CLPEF’s 1998 Day of Remembrance resembles Bell’s 
formulation of a political ritual is striking. The emphasis on the community’s responsibility to 
“let it not happen again” suggests that, as a population that experienced incarceration in America, 
                                               
5 Bell, Ritual, 128.  
6 Ibid., 129. Recalling Bruce Lincoln’s definition of religion, in which he understands religious authority to derive 
from claims on the part of a transcendent status and an assertion of transcendent value, this second part of Bell’s 
definition of political rites appears to get at the religious dimension of these rites.  
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the Japanese American community has moral authority to call out discrimination against and 
violence towards other marginalized groups in America. Furthermore, the location, rhetoric and 
symbols conveyed a “coherent and ordered community.” However, the variations in individuals’ 
conceptions of the purpose and duty of the event are legible upon close viewing.7 
The event took place on February 19, 1998 at the Smithsonian Institution. Chair of the 
Civil Liberties Public Education Fund (CLPEF) board Dale Minami opened the ceremony. In his 
opening remarks, Minami spatially and temporally oriented participants with regard to the 
tradition of the Days of Remembrance. Minami stated that, “This evening’s event is not a unique 
event. The legacy began in 1978 when dedicated individuals and Japanese American community 
organizations organized in producing the first Day of Remembrance in Seattle, Washington. 
Since then, February 19th has become the official Day of Remembrance in local Japanese 
American communities.”8 Minami recognizes the origination of this ceremony among a smaller, 
specific subset of the Japanese American community, and acknowledges the ongoing practice in 
dispersed communities throughout the United States. At the same time, he establishes the current 
1998 moment as a part of a tradition stretching back 20 years. Minami invokes the presence of 
other Days of Remembrance nationwide in his opening remarks: “We are pleased to join with 
Day of Remembrance celebrations taking place in local communities across the nation in 
remembering this historical day.”9 The national ceremony is not portrayed as a substitution for 
local observances or as a next step in the progress of local observances towards a centralized 
ceremony, but rather as concurrent with localized observances. In closing the event, a symbolic 
candle-lighting ceremony evokes the ten WRA concentration camps, again situating this 
                                               




remembrance ceremony in the context of the Japanese American civil religious landscape. 
However, even as this national Day of Remembrance is explicitly situated within a tradition of 
Days of Remembrance in the United States, the 1998 ceremony is distinguished by virtue of its 
position as the first “national” iteration of this event. This moniker heavily informs the rhetoric, 
thematic focus, and implications of the ceremony.  
 The theme of the 1998 Day of Remembrance was “Personal Justice Denied: An Issue for 
All Americans.” The desire for the attention and recognition of “all Americans” or the American 
public is referenced at many points when speakers at the 1998 Day of Remembrance are framing 
the purpose of the event. Minami states that the theme “calls upon the American public to reflect 
on the consequences of the signing of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 which 
stripped an entire population of American citizens and resident aliens of their civil liberties 
solely on account of their ancestry.”10 As it is presented by Minami, part of the intent of having 
an event at the national level was to gain a national level of attention. In an interview before the 
event, Minami states that the event is intended to “…Tell a national audience why it is important 
to remember the lessons of the Japanese internment…in order to impress upon the American 
people why civil rights are so important and so fragile that we must be vigilant at all times, and 
we must be prepared to defend them for not just ourselves, but for all people.”11  
 After his initial remarks, Dale Minami asked board member Kelly Kuwayama to lead 
everyone in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.12 The decision to recite the Pledge is striking for 
many reasons. The Pledge of Allegiance—specifically, the compulsion to recite it—has been 
controversial in and of itself, especially following the 1954 addition of the phrase “under God.” 
                                               
10 Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Although the way in which the film is edited makes it difficult to discern with certainty, it looks as though most if 
not all members of the audience rose for the Pledge, and a multitude of voices reciting the Pledge are audible. 
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Furthermore, Peter Gardella identifies the Pledge of Allegiance as a tool of the American civil 
religion in unifying and holding together American citizens.13 However, most significantly, the 
act of the formerly incarcerated and their friends and family pledging allegiance to America 
while gathered to remember that the state unlawfully incarcerated them on the basis of race, 
unfounded assertions of espionage, and suspicions of disloyalty is profoundly ironic. The Pledge 
of Allegiance in this context is immediately evocative of loyalty tests like the Application for 
Leave Clearance, commonly known as the “loyalty questionnaire” which was distributed in the 
camps. The infamous final two questions on these questionnaires asked Japanese Americans if 
they were (1) willing to forswear allegiance to the Japanese emperor and “swear unqualified 
allegiance to the United States,” and (2) if Nisei men were willing to serve in the United States 
military. From the results of this questionnaire, incarcerees were labeled “loyal” or “disloyal” 
and relocated accordingly—“disloyals” to the high security WRA camp at Tule Lake, and those 
deemed loyal to other camps or cleared to resettle outside of the Western Defense Command. 
Answers to the questionnaire could follow Japanese Americans beyond the camps. When the 
government closed the camps and Japanese Americans were once again forced to uproot and 
move, resettlement was particularly difficult for those men labeled “no-no boys” who answered 
in the negative for both questions. These men were “largely shunned by a Japanese American 
community that emphasized loyalty and military service after the war…castigated by the 
Japanese American community and the broader public as being disloyal traitors to the United 
States.”14  
                                               
13 “Interview with Peter Gardella, Author of American Civil Religion,” Conducted by John D. Wilsey  (phone 
interview), January 2015. https://johndwilsey.com/2015/01/23/interview-with-peter-gardella-author-of-american-
civil-religion/ 
14 “No-no boys,” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. http://encyclopedia.densho.org/No-
no_boys/ 
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 Beyond the irony of the Pledge being recited in this context, its use is also worth 
considering in understanding, as Iwamura formulated, the ways in which a Japanese American 
civil religion is “related to but distinct” from national expressions of civil religious faith. 
Interestingly, one of the primary ways in which federal courts argued that a compulsory 
recitation of the Pledge in a public setting—primarily, in public schools—did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution in spite of the “under God” phrase was through the 
concept of “ceremonial deism.”15 Ceremonial deism is a legal term used to describe “nominally 
religious statements and practices” that “have lost through rote repetition any significant 
religious content.”16 In her opinion in the 2004 case Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow, Justice O’Connor wrote that these references “are not minor trespasses upon the 
Establishment Clause to which I turn a blind eye. Instead, their history, character, and context 
prevent them from being constitutional violations at all.” Proponents of this concept count 
among these statements the national motto—“In God we trust”—as well as the “under God” 
phrase in the Pledge of Allegiance.17 Interestingly, Bellah in his seminal essay on civil religion in 
America rebuts this exact type of argument, criticizing the notion that political references to God 
                                               
15 Sandra Day O’Connor invoked this term in her 2004 concurrence in Elk Grove Unified School District vs. 
Newdow, arguing that “government can, in a discrete category of cases, acknowledge or refer to the divine without 
offending the Constitution. This category of ‘ceremonial deism’ most clearly encompasses such things as the 
national motto (‘In God We Trust’), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such as ‘The Star-Spangled 
Banner,’ [etc.]” Unlike the first two notable challenges to the Pledge, this case came after the 1954 addition of 
“under God” to the Pledge. 
The Supreme Court first heard a challenge to the compulsory recitation of the pledge in the 1940 case of Minersville 
v. Gobitis, in which the court said that a public school could force students who were Jehovah's Witnesses to salute 
the flag and say the pledge. In Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion, compliance with reciting the pledge was 
described as “obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.” 
However, in 1943, the Court changed its course in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the 
majority said that “the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits public schools from forcing students to 
salute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance.” Justice Robert Jackson said in his opinion that “no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 
16 Justice William J. Brennan Jr., dissenting in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984). 
17 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, dissenting Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004). 
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are empty. He writes, “[W]e know enough about the function of ceremony and ritual in various 
societies to make us suspicious of dismissing something as unimportant because it is ‘only a 
ritual.’”18 While the invocation of ceremonial deism attempts to remove the religious character of 
phrases referencing God so as to make them inoffensive to the Constitution, Bellah’s 
interpretation of these very same phrases is that they indicate that in America, sovereignty 
belongs to God. Bellah writes, “In American political theory, sovereignty rests, of course, with 
the people, but implicitly, and often explicitly, the ultimate sovereignty has been attributed to 
God. This is the meaning of the motto ‘In God we trust,’ as well as the inclusion of the phrase 
‘under God’ in the pledge to the flag.”19 While Bellah flags the theological and political 
implications of these references to God, Peter Gardella asserts the practical importance of the 
Pledge of Allegiance to American civil religion: “We [Americans] have no native culture to hold 
us together, but we do have civil religion. We pledge allegiance, affirm our values, etc. and we 
need civil religion very much to fill the void in our culture.”20 Pledging allegiance to the flag and 
“to the republic”—“one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all”—is easily 
legible as a political ritual within Bell’s framework of these rites as “us[ing] symbols and 
symbolic action to depict a group of people as a coherent and ordered community based on 
shared values and goals” and “demonstrat[ing] the legitimacy of these values and goals by 
establishing their iconicity with the perceived value and order of the cosmos.”21 The Pledge 
draws upon the symbolism of the flag and portrays the nation as an indivisible, unified whole, 
attributing to it values of universal liberty and justice and placing it under God’s special 
providence. In considering the Japanese Americans at the 1998 Day of Remembrance as a 
                                               
18 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 41.  
19 Ibid., 42.  
20 Wilsey, “Interview with Peter Gardella.” 
21 Bell, Ritual, 129.  
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population that was singled out, forcefully separated from their fellow citizens, stripped of all 
rights of citizens and incarcerated in concentration camps, their pledging allegiance to an 
“indivisible” nation is discordant. Nonetheless, it evidences various attempts to subsume the 
Japanese American civil religion within the broader fold of American civil religion.  
 As referenced at the outset of this chapter, in an interview before the event, Gordon 
Hirabayashi stated that: “This whole day is underlining the importance of not only the pledge but 
the will and commitment of people to live by certain standards...this day should be remembered 
like the 4th of July for us in terms of what America means to us. And if we could make that a 
living pledge, this country will be great”22 (emphasis mine). While Hirabayashi here is not 
necessarily or explicitly speaking about the Pledge of Allegiance—potentially instead an abstract 
pledge to uphold certain values of tolerance, equality, and justice in America, or pledges by 
government officials on the topic of the incarceration to never forget the event—the choice of 
language and the point he makes here is striking. Hirabayashi in essence deems a pledge alone to 
be insufficient without supplementary action, or “will and commitment” to enact the values 
upheld by such a pledge. Most significantly, Hirabayashi here states that America will be great if 
this pledge becomes lived rather than merely spoken or asserted. Where many other speakers at 
this event and beyond assert the continued greatness of America in their remembrance of the 
incarceration, Hirabayashi’s words stand out as a stronger critique of America’s past. This likely 
reflects his resistance to the exclusion orders and his legal challenge of the constitutionality of 
the incarceration. Hirabayashi’s critique, however, still calls upon the nation to rededicate itself 
to the ideals of America, and thus utilizes the typical language of American civil religion.  
                                               
22 Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony.   
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This quotation of Hirabayashi’s is taken from a series of interviews with certain key 
figures as they arrived at the Smithsonian Institute that Yamada uses to open her film.  All of 
those interviewed are speaking to the same topics—the importance of the Day of Remembrance, 
their hopes for the ceremony, and the relevance of the ceremony to the nation as a whole. These 
testimonies highlight the ways in which individuals were negotiating how the history of the 
incarceration fit in with the nation and its proclaimed values, and seeking to understand their 
own responsibilities to the remembrance movement as activists, scholars, and politicians. 
George Takei, emcee for the evening, is also interviewed before the event, and like 
Hirabayashi, takes time to comment on the principles of America. Takei says: “I think it’s a day 
that should resonate for all Americans that are concerned about the strength and resilience of the 
principles for which this country stands. I think it’s a date that should teach us some lessons. 
And with those lessons we strengthen and re-energize the ideas and principles of America”23 
(emphasis mine). Takei here contests the understanding of America’s principles as inviolable, 
suggesting instead that the incarceration called into question the “strength and resilience” of 
these principles. Takei is hopeful, however, and positions a remembrance of and reflection upon 
the incarceration as a means to fortify and “re-energize” America’s principles. Takei positions 
remembrance as an opportunity for Americans to rededicate themselves to the nation’s 
principles.  Thus, Hirabayashi and Takei both invoke national goals and values in their 
contextualization of the redress movement, and in this sense take as foundational the rhetoric of 
American civil religion.  
Another interviewee, Congressman Robert T. Matsui (D-CA) takes this American civil 
religious rhetoric even farther, portraying Japanese Americans as a model (because self- 
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sacrificial) minority. Matsui’s comments are the most troubling presented in Yamada’s film. 
Matsui asserts that “this day”—February 19th, as a Day of Remembrance—belongs to those who 
had been incarcerated “because they say what is great about America in the sense that they were 
willing to persevere and they were willing to suffer the humiliation of incarceration because of 
their race…”24 Matsui here locates America’s greatness in those incarcerated Japanese 
Americans, portraying their story as one of perseverance and “willingness to suffer” for, it is 
implied, the good of the nation. As regards Matsui’s comments, I am in agreement with Don 
Nakanishi—a member of the CLPEF board who did not speak at the 1998 Day of 
Remembrance—when he contends that narratives framing Japanese Americans as “a minority 
that has risen above even prejudiced criticism” is “an updated version of the notion that the 
Internment tested the character and determination of Japanese Americans.” For Nakanishi, such 
narratives “continuously worked at loggerheads with efforts by Japanese Americans to not only 
grapple with the unfinished business of the Internment, but also to redefine their group status and 
experiences in American society.”25 In other words, casting formerly incarcerated Japanese 
Americans as a “model minority” within America—as model citizens who sacrificed for the 
nation—obscures and complicates Japanese American efforts to interpret their own position in 
relation to the nation state. Furthermore, this logic positions the incarceration as a loyalty or 
character test of sorts that provided Japanese Americans with the opportunity to prove 
themselves as citizens, to prove their worthiness, and to prove their willingness to sacrifice in 
order to be counted as citizens. Nakanishi writes that, “Like earlier interpretations, the success 
story thesis treated the Internment as past history,”26 and thus suggests that this type of narrative 
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25 Nakanishi, “Surviving Democracy’s Mistake,” 23.  
26 Ibid., 23.  
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actively impedes the Japanese American community’s efforts to both reflect on their own 
position within the nation and to continue to fight for their own civil liberties and those of others. 
While Matsui praises Japanese American activism and perseverance and advocates that the Day 
of Remembrance continues to be practiced every year, he retains an understanding of America’s 
greatness that coexists in one sentence with an acknowledgement of the nation’s history of race-
based violence and disenfranchisement.  
Interestingly, Matsui’s comments here have implications reminiscent of Bellah’s 
discussion of civil religion and pluralism in The Broken Covenant (1975). Bellah devotes a 
chapter in this work to the discussion of the position of the group, “particularly groups that 
differed significantly from the majority of the early colonists,” in the “developing pattern of 
symbol and myth in America.”27 In this section, Bellah develops a formulation in which a 
“transvaluation of roles…turns the despised and oppressed [those racially or ethnically othered 
and excluded from society] into symbols of salvation and rebirth,” writing that this shift “is an 
indication of new cultural directions, perhaps of a deep cultural revolution.”28 In this framework, 
the inclusion of the formerly excluded into the body politic affords salvation for the nation. Thus, 
even within Bellah’s attempt at addressing pluralism and fitting the minority group into the 
American “pattern of symbol and myth,” he maintains a construction of center—the original 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestant settler—versus margins—everyone else—and maintains a 
hierarchical binary between these groups. In this troubling conclusion, the dominant majority are 
redeemed through their inclusion of those on the margins, with those on the margins becoming 
icons of personal and national salvation. When Matsui takes the racially-discriminated-against 
Japanese American incarceree as symbol of what is great about America, he ascribes to this 
                                               
27 Bellah, Broken Covenant, 87.  
28 Ibid., 106.  
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complex of salvation that furthermore relegates the incarceration to a “finished” event of the 
past. 
The competing visions of America presented by those interviewed at the 1998 Day of 
Remembrance in Yamada’s film—as already great versus aspiring to greatness—are likewise 
evidenced by letters from government officials presented at the ceremony. In the course of the 
evening’s program, two letters from national politicians were read—the first from President Bill 
Clinton, and the second from Congresswoman Maxine Waters. The disparate ways in which 
these two letters discuss the incarceration and its memorialization are exemplary of the different 
conceptions of America and America’s relation to Japanese Americans that exist within the 
activist community and remembrance movement. President Clinton’s letter was read first by 
Doris Matsui, who had been incarcerated in Poston and in 1998 was serving as deputy special 
assistant to the president. President Clinton’s comments on the memorialization of the 
incarceration in his letter read: 
 Warm greetings to everyone gathered in our nation’s capital to observe the national Day  
 of Remembrance sponsored by the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund to ensure that  
 our nation understands and learns from one of our most tragic mistakes. We must never  
 forget the forced internment of thousands of Japanese Americans during World War II.  
 This solemn occasion reminds all Americans of a sad chapter in our history and helps us  
 to continue the process of reconciliation and healing… You are helping us acknowledge  
 the mistakes of the past so that together, we can build a better and brighter future for us  
 all.29 
 
President Clinton in his strongest denunciation refers to the incarceration as merely as a 
“mistake,” then as “a sad chapter in our history.” Clinton’s words are hopeful, casting the 
incarceration as a mere error of the past that must be remembered in the effort to “build a 
brighter and better future for us all.” However, Clinton leaves unstated the ways in which and the 
extent to which America has been involved in a long “process of reconciliation and healing.” 
                                               
29 Yamada, Day of Remembrance: The First National Ceremony. 
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Calls for individual reparations originated in Japanese American communities as early as 1970 
and did not obtain congressional approval until 1988. When the Civil Liberties Act (CLA) was 
finally passed in 1988 the nation offered an apology and reparations payments, but these $20,000 
sums were more symbolic than compensatory considering the severe economic, psychological, 
and emotional impact of the incarceration. Estimating the true value of the losses of Japanese 
Americans as a result of the incarceration has been a difficult endeavor in part because most 
essential financial records were no longer available after the war. By 1948, the Department of 
Justice found that “the Internal Revenue Service had already destroyed most of the 1939 to 1942 
income tax returns of evacuees--the most comprehensive set of federal financial records.”30 
Furthermore, as the JACL argued in 1954, “In the stress and tension of 1942, when one did not 
know how long he would be detained or whether he would ever be allowed to return, it would be 
unreasonable to expect that emotion-charged men and women would have chosen to pack books 
and records instead of the food, the medicines, and the clothing which they took with them…”31 
However, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), which 
heard the testimonies that eventually resulted in the passage of the Civil Liberties Act in 1998, 
commissioned an independent firm to estimate total economic losses in 1983, and the figure 
provided by their estimate was “as high as 6.2 billion,” approximately four times the sum that the 
government eventually paid in individual reparations.32  
Moreover, the CLA’s apology, issued over 40 years after the government closed the last 
camp, came when tens of thousands of those incarcerated had already passed away. The first 
                                               
30 Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(Washington, D.C.: Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians; Seattle: University of 
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31 Personal Justice Denied, 118-119. 
32 Wesley G. Pippert, “The economic losses of Japanese-Americans interned during World War II,” United Press 
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reparations payments were not issued until 1990, with a total of 82,219 individuals receiving 
redress payment as compared to the approximately 120,000 who had been incarcerated.33 
Furthermore, the Civil Liberties Act initially authorized $50 million for the CLPEF, but “as a 
result of intense lobbying [on the part of other federal programs competing for the same pool of 
funds] from 1988 to 1992, only $5 million was finally appropriated in 1994.”34 From this 
account, it is difficult to extract a perception of the government as an equal partner to the 
Japanese American community in a process of reconciliation and healing, and to do so obscures 
the struggle of these communities to secure government reparations and recognition. 
 Immediately following Matsui’s reading of President Clinton’s letter, Dale Minami read a 
letter from Congresswoman Maxine Waters. In 1998, Waters represented California’s 35th 
congressional district and chaired the Congressional Black Caucus. Waters’ letter begins with a 
brief overview of the facts of the incarceration, followed by her most condemning words: 
As a result of this official government act [Executive Order 9066], thousands of patriotic 
Japanese American families were condemned to harsh concentration camps across the 
Western United States, Japanese Americans lost their homes, farms, and businesses, and 
most fundamentally their human rights. Their years of incarceration always must be 
remembered as one of the country’s most shameful acts. Unfortunately, official racial 
discrimination has been an integral part of most of our nation’s history. Slavery, Jim 
Crow segregation, and the genocide of Native Americans have fundamentally defined 
and shaped America. In this sense, the incarceration of Japanese Americans was a grave 
but not surprising continuation of this nation’s racial injustice. Like the battle for 
freedom, equality, and full democracy by African Americans, the fight for redress and 
reparations by Japanese Americans is a struggle to redeem the soul of America from the 
brutality of its past.35 
 
                                               
33 “Civil Liberties Act of 1988,” Denshō Digital Encyclopedia, Copyright Denshō 2018. 
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There is much in Waters’ letter that warrants attention. First, Waters explicitly attributes to 
government action the fundamental loss of human rights that Japanese Americans experienced as 
a part of the incarceration. In comparison, the entirety of President Clinton’s letter, much of 
which is quoted above, makes no mention of the government nor of its involvement in or 
culpability for the incarceration. Second, in Waters’ words, the incarceration was a “shameful 
act” rather than as in Clinton’s phrasing a “tragic mistake.” Also relevant here is Waters’ use of 
“incarceration” in comparison to Clinton’s “internment.” As discussed in my introduction, Roger 
Daniels notes that the language used to describe the incarceration plays a crucial role in the 
“down-playing of the negative aspects of the wartime experience,” which Daniels identifies as a 
“corollary of what can be called American secular triumphalism.”36 While Waters’ 
“incarceration” and “concentration camp” combat the triumphalist narrative, Clinton’s 
“internment” does little to challenge it.  
The third notable difference between the two statements, however, lies in the way in 
which the incarceration itself is evaluated. To Waters, the incarceration was neither a “mistake” 
nor a “sad chapter,” but “a grave but not surprising continuation of this nation’s racial injustice.” 
The incarceration was not a tragic mistake but was rather part and parcel of America’s history of 
racism (or white supremacy). Whereas Clinton treats this episode as anomalous, Waters sees it as 
continuous with American history. Waters’ critique, Karen Leong and Myla Carpio would argue, 
is rare among those critiques of the nation in that it takes as “foundational [the] acts of 
colonization and genocide” rather than “the founding document of the U.S. Constitution.”37  
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Waters’ letter, like Clinton’s, ends on a hopeful note. However, the language is much less 
euphemistic. While Clinton characterizes the work of Japanese American activists as helpful in 
acknowledging past mistakes in the name of a bright future, Waters describes this community’s 
work as “a struggle to redeem the soul of America from the brutality of its past.” To Waters, the 
“soul” of America was lost to past violence, and it will be a “battle” and a “struggle” to redeem 
it. Waters’ phrasing thus highlights the contentious nature of memorialization and the human 
effort required to redeem the nation by remembering the incarceration. Clinton, on the other 
hand, describes remembrance activity not as a “battle” but as a “process of reconciliation and 
healing,” implying unity, cooperation, and ultimate resolution.  
One point of consistency across Clinton’s and Waters’ letters is their acknowledgement 
of the importance of memorialization. This emphasis, made evident in the hopeful closure to 
both letters, indicates a belief in the potential for positive change that highlights a paradox 
evident in the endeavor to remember the incarceration. Here, and throughout the remembrance 
movement, remembering the nation’s failure and the injustice of the incarceration is positioned 
as work that will forge inclusion, justice, and an opportunity for America to successfully carry 
out its promises of toleration and equality. Both politicians position the memorialization as 
possibly affording redemption, which is in keeping with the narrative of American civil religion. 
 In considering the Days of Remembrance as public rituals, one aspect of the 1998 Day of 
Remembrance which must be discussed is the use of media to publicize the event. As with the 
1978 Day of Remembrance, much of the outreach was done through the use of media, but in the 
later event this was accomplished through the use of nationally-broadcast public service 
announcements. Concurrent with the 1998 Day of Remembrance and screened at the event were 
three national public service announcements about the Day of Remembrance produced by Gayle 
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Yamada and aired in cities across the nation. Before Yamada’s public service announcements 
were screened, she took to the stage to describe her vision for the three clips: one 15-seconds, 
one 30-seconds, and one 60-seconds long. Yamada said:  
 [T]he Civil Liberties Public Education Fund asked [Diane Fukami and I] to help create  
 some kind of legacy for [the CLPEF]. What better way we thought, than to use the power 
 of the media to remind Americans of a terrible wrong and of an apology? When I thought 
 of the message we wanted to deliver to millions of Americans, I thought of the pain of a  
 people that was focused for me on my father’s experiences during the war at Manzanar  
 and on my mother’s, who was incarcerated at Heart Mountain. I wanted to make the  
 television public service announcement very painful and very personal for everyone who  
 saw it.38 
 
Yamada’s understanding of what can be learned from the incarceration is informed by her 
family’s experiences, the takeaway from which is “the pain of a people” as well as the personal 
pain of individuals. To make her PSAs striking to the American public, Yamada attempts to 
communicate the pain and, more importantly, the personal nature of this pain—arguably harder 
to ignore than more vague statements about the experience of a collective group. According to 
Yamada’s testimony at the Day of Remembrance, the public service announcements were 
playing “in cities all over the country, from San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, 
Cleveland, Honolulu, Wyoming, Tennessee, and of course…right here in Washington, D.C.”39 
 Yamada’s three public service announcements follow a similar format. Each utilizes a 
series of black and white photographs of the camps—primarily those taken by Ansel Adams and 
Dorothea Lange at Manzanar, as well as Toyo Miyatake’s famous “Boys Behind Barbed Wire” 
photograph—that emphasize the camps’ desolation and prominently feature barbed wire. Also 
featured in each public service announcement is an image of a guard tower with two armed 
guards standing atop it. Text in each PSA advertises a “Day of Remembrance, February 19th.” In 
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the longer two public service announcements, George Takei narrates. The script of the 30-second 
public service announcement is as follows: 
 It was called wartime military necessity. 120,000 of us incarcerated by a presidential  
 order. Americans of Japanese ancestry behind barbed wire, with armed guards. There  
 were no charges, no trial, only imprisonment. It happened during World War II. We must 
 never forget this time when Americans were denied their constitutional rights because of  
 fear, racism, hysteria. It must never happen again to any American. 
This narrative calls attention to the injustice of the incarceration by emphasizing the lack of due 
process and specifically highlighting the denial of “constitutional rights because of fear, racism, 
[and] hysteria.” The public service announcement is personal in that it features many close-
cropped images of Japanese Americans in camp, yet the narration itself speaks of the collective 
group. The 60-second PSA, in contrast, features George Takei—visible on the screen this time, 
not solely narrating—telling his story of being incarcerated. Standing in a desolate scrub desert, 
he begins: “I learned to read in a place like this. To write, play baseball. I was four years old. 
They gave me the number 12832-C. Prisons like this were home to 120,000 of us during World 
War II.” The rest of the narration closely maps onto that of the 30-second public service 
announcement, but this account stands out among the three public service announcements as 
highly personal. The imagery of a child learning to read and write—meaningful life events 
associated with home and family—is juxtaposed with the desolate imagery of the camp’s setting 
to paint an unsettling picture. In this way, Yamada conveys the exact type of personal pain she 
intended to.  
Notably, the 60-second public service announcement ends with a clip of a group of 
schoolchildren reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Text overlaid reads “Day of Remembrance, 
February 19th.” It is unclear here how Yamada intends the portrayal of the Pledge of Allegiance 
to be taken. The Pledge can be read in this context as a signifier of some degree of ambivalence 
with regard to Japanese Americans asserting their inclusion within a nation that discriminated 
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against and imprisoned them. Yamada could also be emphasizing the violent racism that was 
brought to bear on Japanese Americans by highlighting the vulnerability and loyalty of children 
in contrast to the depictions of a sinister Japanese American enemy during the war.  
The difference between the 1978 and 1998 Days of Remembrance is striking. Whereas 
the radicality of the 1970s saw plans to destroy symbols of the state such as the guard tower at 
Minidoka, the 1998 Day of Remembrance opens with a Pledge of Allegiance to the nation as 
symbolized by the flag. Here, the ritual remembrance of the incarceration includes a celebration 
of rather than a reappropriation and redeployment of symbols of the state. Moreover, the symbols 
of the state invoked have shifted from symbols of the state’s racial discrimination and violence—
identification tags, barbed wire, army trucks—to the flag, which Gardella claims “sacramentally 
contains the land, people, government, and spirit of the United States.”40  
Yamada’s recording of the first national Day of Remembrance ceremony effectively 
captures the ways in which many prominent figures in the national Japanese American 
community understand themselves, their activism, and the Japanese American community in 
relation to the nation. Other than Maxine Waters and, to a lesser extent, Gordon Hirabayashi, no 
speakers at the 1998 Day of Remembrance forward an understanding of the nation as 
fundamentally violent or discriminatory. While the change in the level of critique from 1978 to 
1998 is striking, the historical and political contexts of the two events must be considered in a 
comparison of the critical nature of these events. The 1998 Day of Remembrance came a decade 
after the long campaign for redress and individual reparations had culminated in success with the 
1988 Civil Liberties Act. In 1978, the Japanese American community was asserting itself 
publicly for the very first time and constructing a collective identity and memory that worked to 
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socially revitalize the community. That the incarceration was collectively remembered was not a 
given in 1978 as it had come to be in 1998, and thus the more radical reenactment was perhaps 
essential at this time. Nonetheless, the nationalization of the Day of Remembrance ritual in 1998 
reflects a continued grappling with the significance of patriotism and Americanness to the 
Japanese American community. In 1998, the relation between Japanese Americans and the 





Concluding Thoughts and the Japanese American Civil Religion Today 
 
 
On February 19, 2018, I attended the Day of Remembrance ceremony in Seattle, 
Washington. The theme of the 2018 event, organized by Denshō, was “Our History, Our 
Responsibility.” Tom Ikeda, Denshō founder, described Denshō’s intention with the event as one 
of community formation between Japanese Americans and American Muslims. Ikeda said that 
the event was about “connecting, and talking about each other and what’s going on in the 
country…What we [Denshō] really want to do is connect these communities—the Japanese 
American community with the Muslim community.” The basis for this connection, according to 
Ikeda, comes “from a place of love and caring and shared suffering.” The particular shared 
suffering that Ikeda refers to is the “cruel reality” experienced by Japanese Americans during the 
incarceration and by Muslim Americans since 9/11, of “be[ing] an immigrant who has sacrificed 
so much for a life in a country that sees you as the enemy because of your race or religion.” The 
rhetoric of the event focused more accurately not just on the experience of being labeled an 
enemy on the basis of race, but on being so labeled even in spite of clear demonstrations of 
American patriotism—namely, through patriotic service.  
Khizr Khan, constitutional rights lawyer and Gold Star parent, was the keynote speaker 
for the event.1 Ikeda described his rationale for selecting Khan in terms of this connection based 
in a common experience of America. Ikeda states that seeing Khizr and his wife Ghazala Khan 
address the Democratic National Convention made him think of what his grandparents might 
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have thought 72 years prior when they received the American flag for the death of their eldest 
son killed in combat in World War II. Ikeda said,  
I also thought how difficult it must have been for my grandparents to have to accept the 
flag while on a dusty field in an American concentration camp in Idaho, incarcerated 
because they were suspected of not being loyal enough to the country their son fought 
and died for… It must have taken so much strength and conviction for them to have been 
treated so badly and sacrificed so much. 
 
The advertisement for the 2018 Day of Remembrance in Seattle utilized an image of precisely 
this scene, which Ikeda claimed captured the “underlying feeling” of the connection between 
Muslim and Japanese Americans in this current moment. At the 2018 Day of Remembrance, this 
connection was largely asserted through discussions of patriotism in the face of discrimination.  
 On this occasion, however, patriotism was specifically tied to sacrifice. Khizr Khan’s 
keynote speech rarely strayed from the topic of military service. Khan emphasized the 
exceptional patriotism of Japanese Americans who fought in World War II despite the nation’s 
prejudice and despite their own incarceration and that of their families. To this end, Khan quoted 
Japanese American Senator Daniel Inouye: “When given a chance, Japanese Americans proved, 
with much blood spilled, that their courage and patriotism were beyond question, and that 
Americanism was not a matter of skin color or ethnicity. In fighting for justice abroad, Japanese 
Americans were also fighting injustice at home.” Khan’s speech emphasized the remembrance of 
Japanese American veterans above all. Khan goes on to say that “Because of the patriotic 
sacrifices of all those who served …others, including Muslims today, all Americans today, gain 
courage and inspiration to have faith in the democratic values of our nation. You have, by your 
example, by your sacrifice, by your families’ sacrifice, you have taught us well. You have taught 
this nation well. Thank you for your contribution to our nation.” Similar to Bellah’s formulation 
of the once oppressed as “icons of salvation,” Khan positions the sacrifice of Japanese 
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Americans as redeeming, arguing that their sacrifice inspires others to have faith in America’s 
values. This is typical of the rhetoric of military sacrifice, but Khan here seems to assert that 
precisely because Japanese Americans sacrificed in spite of their incarceration and the nation’s 
racism, their sacrifice is more powerful.  
 The rhetoric of this event appears to map on well with the opinions expressed at the 1998 
Day of Remembrance which draw upon the inviolable nature of America’s principles and take as 
foundational the language of American civil religion. However, as a result of the current political 
climate, the 2018 Day of Remembrance also has a critical role that is, in a way, more particular 
and overt than any previous iteration of the Days of Remembrance examined in this paper.  
Introducing Khizr Khan, Varisha Khan, communications coordinator for the Washington 
state Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-WA), a co-presenter of the Day of 
Remembrance, recounted that: “During the 2016 presidential race, Khizr and Ghazala Khan gave 
an impassioned speech at the Democratic National Convention. Khizr criticized Donald Trump, 
who is now our president, famously asking him: ‘Let me ask you, have you even read the United 
States Constitution? I will gladly lend you my copy.’” Even with the political orientation of both 
of the previous Days of Remembrance examined in this paper, neither explicitly drew upon or 
referenced any critique of a standing member of the current political system—much less the 
president—by name. The choice of Khizr Khan as a keynote speaker speaks to the politicization 
of the Days of Remembrance. Furthermore, concerns over “the state of the nation” are 
continually invoked, with Varisha Khan calling attention to specific policies—the Muslim ban, 
increased deportations, attempts to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
policy, and the proposed border wall between the U.S. and Mexico—that she finds to be 
concerningly reminiscent of the post-9/11 period.  
 93 
 The post-9/11 period has seen a new role emerge in the Japanese American civil religion, 
that of providing a platform for other marginalized groups—prominently, Muslim Americans—
and speaking out against discrimination on their behalf. The Manzanar pilgrimage in 2002, 2003, 
and 2005 focused thematically on solidarity with Muslim Americans and issues of racial 
profiling.2 In September of 2017, the JACL submitted amicus curiae briefs in Trump v. 
International Refugee Assistance Program and Trump v. the State of Hawaii, Supreme Court 
cases concerning the constitutionality of Trump’s “travel bans”—Executive Order 13,769 and 
Proclamation No. 9645, respectively. In 2018 in Seattle, this explicit critique of particular actions 
of the government cast the state in sharp contrast to the “superpatriotic”3 description of Japanese 
Americans and Muslim Americans in the armed services.  
As discussed in the context of the national Day of Remembrance, Japanese American 
interpretations of patriotism and Americanness in 1998 were still unsettled, and this ambivalence 
came across in the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance as well as in the commentary from 
various individuals as they attempted to define their relationship and the community’s 
relationship to the nation as a whole. Here, the rhetoric of American civil religion is in tension 
with the more critical perspective embodied in Maxine Waters’ letter to the CLPEF. At the 2018 
Day of Remembrance, patriotism was essentially conflated with military service, with much 
more emphasis placed on the service of the all-Japanese 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd 
Regimental Combat Unit. However, other scholars—notably, Chris Iijima—call attention to 
“those heroic ‘others’—Japanese American draft resisters who refused to fight for the United 
                                               
2 “Past Pilgrimages,” The Manzanar Committee. Accessed 5 May, 2018. 
http://www.manzanarcommittee.org/The_Manzanar_Committee/Past_Pilgrimages.html 
3 Chris K. Iijima, “Reparations and the Model Minority Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse to 
Return to the Original Humiliation,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 19, no. 1 (1998), 385-427.  
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States until their families were freed from the camps.”4 These men, and other resisters, Iijima 
points out, “also sacrificed for hallowed democratic principles.”5 References to this type of 
sacrifice, however, are largely absent from the rhetoric of the 2018 Day of Remembrance, as 
they were from Congressional debates over the passage of the 1988 Civil Liberties Act.6 Indeed, 
it was not until 2002 that the JACL apologized for its condemnation and poor treatment of draft 
resisters during the war.  
These questions of patriotism and the acceptance of the rhetoric of American civil 
religion get at one of the chief questions underlying this project—the question of the precise 
relationship between American and Japanese American civil religion. This question is difficult to 
answer, in part, because dominant theories of American civil religion place focus primarily on 
the discursive and overemphasize unity, while the Japanese American civil religion highlights 
material as well as ideological concerns of civil religion, illuminating strains of dissent within 
the body politic and calling attention to the nation’s practices of exclusion. To illuminate such 
contestations and to dispute the national myth of tolerance and just action challenges and 
critiques a vision of national unity. The Japanese American civil religion, emerging from a 
collective experience of racial violence, intolerance, and disenfranchisement, illuminates gaps in 
Bellah’s theory of American civil religion. Bellah fails to acknowledge the implications of 
persistent marginalization, racism, and exclusion for his theory of American civil religion. Bellah 
asserts that the nation endures “times of trial” during which it is tested, and from which new 
values within the American civil religion emerge. For example, Bellah interprets the Civil War 
                                               
4 Iijima, “Reparations and the Model Minority,” 398.  
5 Ibid., 399.  
6 In Iijima’s work, he highlights the paradox of the Congressional debates surrounding the passage of the CLA in 
that they praised the acquiescent responses to incarceration and ignored the active dissent and resistance to 
incarceration while officially acknowledging the injustice and unlawfulness of the incarceration and Executive 
Order. 
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as a test of, as Lincoln said in 1861, “whether [this] nation, or any nation so conceived, and so 
dedicated, can long endure.”7 In these times of trial, America’s adherence to its values of liberty, 
equality, and a flourishing of rights for all people is taken as foundational. The nation’s 
commitment to these values is not questioned. What is questioned instead is whether a nation 
that does commit to these values, that represents the quintessential democratic experiment, can 
survive. From the Civil War, Bellah contends, “a new theme of death, sacrifice, and rebirth 
enters the civil religion [as] symbolized in the life and death of Lincoln.”8 What is more relevant 
about the Civil War to this project, and what Bellah does not consider, is what the war reveals in 
the civil religion about the lasting impact of slavery and the willingness of the nation to include 
the formerly enslaved in the body politic. Bellah’s “time of trial” does not extend beyond the 
years of the Civil War to address the continuing racism, disenfranchisement, and violence aimed 
at excluding from American society the black population.  
Bellah, writing after the incarceration as well as in the early years of the redress 
movement, does not mention the incarceration in his discussions of civil religion and American 
history. Those who do use American civil religious rhetoric to discuss the incarceration in 
relation to American principles often fall back on the “success story” narrative of the sacrifice 
and redemption of a model minority.9 The incarceration is framed as an event that ultimately 
strengthened the nation, and presents an opportunity for the rededication to and renewal of the 
nation’s values. This narrative ignores the century of racism preceding the incarceration which 
entailed exclusionary immigration acts and denials of citizenship on the basis of Japanese 
ancestry. Ascribing to the rhetoric of American civil religion and adhering to the “national myth” 
                                               
7 Bellah, “Civil Religion,” 47.  
8 Ibid., 47-48.  
9 This is the case with the comments of Bill Clinton, Robert Matsui, and George Takei in Chapter 3. 
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of America as a paragon of virtue treats the incarceration as a chapter of American history and 
obscures the continued impact of racism and exclusion on the Japanese American community.  
This approach, however, is in line with Bellah’s work. Dominant theorists of American 
civil religion—Bellah, Gardella, and Gorski—are careful to preach tolerance and unity over 
exclusion and dissent. This should not be surprising—these scholars, as white elites, benefit from 
the myth of America as self-correcting and just. Indeed, in reading Bellah’s work it becomes 
clear that not only is much of his focus on ideological questions of faith, but also much of his 
work addresses his own faith in the vision of America as he constructs it. In this sense Bellah is 
not just a theorist but also an advocate of American civil religion. It is this faith in and advocacy 
for this particular vision of America that drives Bellah to focus on the discursive and ideological. 
To do otherwise—to give attention to disputes over claims to and the meaning of sacred space or 
to rituals marking past and ongoing racialized violence, as the Japanese American civil religion 
demands—would be to fracture Bellah’s own formulation of transcendent unity.  
Bellah’s theory of American civil religion, intended to bring together religion and 
politics, called attention to the religious dimensions of political discourse. Yet in asserting a 
religion of the state that transcends sectarian and political divisions, Bellah’s work also 
depoliticized civil religion, removing from the category any presence of dissent or conflict. 
These elite formulations of civil religion—those which focus on presidential prophecy or the 
martyred soldier—facilitate this depoliticization. The Japanese American civil religion represents 
a repoliticization of the category. While the Japanese American civil religion emphasizes and 
takes as transcendent certain values—equality, tolerance, and a remembrance of the past for the 
sake of preventing future injustice—this set of ideals does not constitute a placeholder for unity. 
Moreover, the responsibility for the upholding of these ideals is placed squarely on the shoulders 
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of the participants in the Japanese American civil religion. Where Bellah relies on God as a 
transcendent placeholder for unity, able to call the nation into account should Americans forget 
their values, the Japanese American civil religion places this responsibility, and thus, sovereignty 
with the people. However, rather than emphasizing and reinstating unity, this population takes as 
its responsibility the calling of the nation into account for transgressions of its proclaimed 
principles. As Iwamura contended, critique is foundational to the Japanese American civil 
religion.  
The Japanese American civil religion reveals the persistence and violence of racial 
discrimination, endemic disputes over the possession and meaning of land, and the ideological 
and budgetary power of governmental institutions. The Japanese American civil religion thus 
draws attention to the unsettled and constantly contested borders and visions of the nation. The 
political nature of the Japanese American civil religion challenges an understanding of religions 
as homogenous units free from difference, dissidence, and contention. At the same time, the 
Japanese American civil religion highlights the foundational importance of space and land to 
religion, challenging any largely ideological conception of religion and instead making a case for 
an understanding of religion in society as something which takes up physical space. I contend 
that theories of religion should make room for and accept the presence of dissent in all 
domains—in the institutions, discourse, practices, and communities—of a religion. Moreover, 
boundaries of sacred time and space must be understood to be flexible and dynamic, subject to 
the influences of politics and historical context.  
Bellah’s formulation of American civil religion has always positioned pluralism as a 
potential challenge to social solidarity in America. The possibility of multiple civil religions 
emerging from this pluralistic society likewise presents a challenge to future work on American 
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civil religion.10 As illustrated, rival civil religions in America may present formidable ideological 
and spatial challenges to American civil religion. The possibility of multiple civil religions in 
America that serve to undermine American civil religion and its vision of unity then begs the 
question: is American civil religion still a useful concept? While the extent to which American 
civil religion has any real integrative power may be debated at length, the institutions and 
rhetoric of American civil religion undoubtedly remain powerful.  
Future studies of civil religion in America must take into account not only the internal (to 
the United States) contestations over sacred space and the interpretations thereof, but also the 
increasing instability of the national border—the authority and boundaries of which Rhys 
Williams claimed was American civil religion’s “ultimate referent.”11 In considering the reliance 
of American civil religion on the conception of the definable nation-state, theories of civil 
religion must be wary and critical of the role of American civil religion in ideologically 
constructing this border. At its most dangerous, the national myth in American civil religious 
rhetoric has a very real power to lend authority to policies of exclusion and to heighten division 
in the name of preserving the nation’s border. 
 
                                               
10 Marvin & Ingle, “Blood Sacrifice and the Nation.” 
11 Williams, “Cultural Politics,” 253.  
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Appendix: Images of Assembly Center Memorials 	
Sacramento 
 
Figure 1. Plaza at Walerga Park, CA, the site of the former Sacramento Assembly Center. The 
State Historic designation plaque sits at the far end of the plaza, and Interstate 80 lies just at the 




Figure 2. Memorial plaque at Walerga Park, CA, site of the former Sacramento Assembly Center. 
The plaque was placed and designated in 1987, and the lettering has since faded to be essentially 












Figure 3. California State Historic Landmark plaque at the San Joaquin County Fairgrounds, 
formerly the Stockton Assembly Center. The Stockton Assembly Center memorial is under 
California State Historical Landmark No. 934, as are all other California assembly centers that 
successfully secured a State Historical Landmark designation. This memorial plaque sits to the 












Figure 4. The Merced Assembly Center memorial at the Merced County Fairgrounds. The 
memorial features storyboards, a sculpture, benches, a list of the names of those incarcerated, and 




Figure 5. Sculpture at the Merced Assembly Center memorial. The sculpture features a child sitting 
atop a pile of suitcases with identification tags issued in the evacuation.  
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Figure 8. Gerard Tsutakawa fountain at the site of the former Pinedale Assembly Center in 
Fresno, CA. The site of the former Pinedale Assembly Center has been developed into a 


























Figure 9. Plaque describing Gerard Tsutakawa’s memorial fountain at the site of the former 

























Figure 10. California State Historical Landmark plaque at the former Pinedale Assembly Center 
site. This plaque and the plaque at the site of the former Fresno Assembly Center (see below) 
share the exact same language, likely because they both lie within Fresno city limits and these 



















































Figure 11. California State Historical Landmark plaque at the former Fresno Assembly Center. 
This memorial lies within the Fresno County Fairgrounds, and is situated within a larger plaza 
that includes storyboards, the names of those incarcerated, a fountain, and replicated Civilian 
Exclusion Orders (see Figure 12 below). As noted above, the wording of this plaque is identical 





Figure 12. Replicated Civilian Exclusion Orders at the Fresno Assembly Center memorial. There 
are in total four of these signs posted at each corner of the memorial plaza in the Fresno County 
Fairgrounds. At the time of the evacuation, these orders were hung around cities and Japanese 
American communities much like this, affixed to streetlights and other available surfaces, alerting 
the Japanese American community to their impending evacuation. The replication of this 
historical event is reminiscent of the reenactment and reappropriation of symbols at the Puyallup 













Figure 13. Commemorative Garden at the former site of the Tanforan Assembly Center. The 
garden sits in a small raised plot of land at the entrance to the Shops at Tanforan, a high end mall 
in San Bruno California that was developed on the former site of the Tanforan Racetrack, where 
Japanese Americans (most from California’s Bay Area) were incarcerated in 1942.  
 
 
Figure 14. Memorial plaque at the Tanforan Assembly Center. Notably, this plaque is not a state 
historical or state-sponsored plaque, but was funded and designated by former incarcerees and 








Figure 15. George Tsutakawa’s memorial, “Harmony,” at the Washington State Fairgrounds, 
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